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IN THE UTAH COURT OF VPPr 
STATE OF UTAH, 
rhiiiilirf'/AppclU'c, 
v. 
JUAN QUITERIO PEREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
" \H CODE ANN. § 76-6-203 (1999), and attempted criminal homicide, a 
second Jegree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (1999). This Court 
has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)0) (1996). 
1. Is any error in instructing I In- |iirv on the depraved indifference 
ill11 n.ilive for attempted criminal homicide harmless, absent any evidence that 
'' ', ilimit ticti".! u/i'.U '.VMM '.'.!'.'. •.'.'.'.•.'. '."('.'"I'/t'.i'.i! ,.,.l.'.',.l.('.1.'. s'.'.1.',1.'.' 
erroneous decision \\\ ,i 111,iI i i MM I i inim! icsull in reversible error unless the 
error is harmful."' State v. Piansia..„ne, 954 P.2d 861, 870 (Utah 1998) (quoting State 
v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah • °n^ss '"Harmless error is an error that is 
sufficiently inconsequential that llic.. . ^ j ^ : . . . . .:.. 
( i Nn >niinn^|7 ( \ 
Priority No. 2 
outcome of the proceedings. Put differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of 
a different outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in the verdict.'" 
Id. at 870-871. 
2. After defendant objected that the State failed to give notice that Officer 
Wathen would testify as an expert, did the trial court plainly err in not sua sponte 
ordering a continuance? 
Because no continuance was requested below, defendant cannot prevail on appeal 
absent a demonstration of plain error on the part of the trial court. To establish plain 
error the appellant must show that an enror exists, the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court, and the error is harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 
1993). If any one of these requirements is not met, plain error is not established. Id. at 
1209. 
3. Did the trial court plainly err in not declaring a mistrial based on its own 
conduct? 
Defendant raised no objection to the tenor or demeanor of the trial court's rulings 
and comments below. Therefore, as with the previous issue, the plain error standard 
applies. 
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4. Dia the trial court abuse its wide sentencing discretion by imposing 
co iisecutive sentences for the aggravated burglar d attempted homicide 
convictions? 
I |i « I i Mi I mi | K s n i l ' n f I'M) I " i ,j if »f], iinii 'Vr«;t^ enf-- -h •* * - e 
discretion of the court." State i J *etei son, bbl P.2d 1J109 1219 (Uta , 
" i ^ "chweitzer, 943 P.2d 649. 651 (Utah \pi i " ^ * ordingly, the appellate 
™ in not overturn ...... .—:_mg 
(liisnilii wwYiW, W P ?d nit ( SI; State v f H nee ' * P.2d381 '«•• r -r 
App. 1997). An abuse of discretion maybe found __ mg is in1 \ » t * • i ,,tly iip^u*, 
clearly excessive, or imposed without considering all legally relevant factors 
1
 I n i iii1 i n i" I -vertheic^, 
nl ill I ill | i iiiii * * -rn-onah1 - ' r -" nl would take the view auupicu uy mc 
trial court- i - ^
 0 _ , 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
nminai imrder if the actor: 
*va) intent.ui.a-' v or Knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another commits an act 
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidence a depraved indifference to human 
life engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of anotherf.] 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-l7-l3(4)(a) (1999): 
If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of this 
section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or 
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
Utah R. Evid. 611(a): 
Control by court The court shall exercise reasonable control over the 
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to 
(1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment 
of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect the 
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, and 
attempted murder, a second degree felony (R. 2-4). Following a two-day jury trial held 
on 18-19 April 2000, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 320-321). The trial court 
sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of five-years-to-life for the aggravated 
burglary, and one-year-to-fifteen years for the attempted murder (R. 332-333). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 334). The case was transferred to 
this Court from the Utah Supreme Court on 4 August 2000 (R. 354). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant broke in to 65-year-old Ellen Kuhel's apartment and violently assaulted 
her in her hospital bed with a knife (R. 3 59:191). In the weeks prior to the attack, 
defendant repeatedly told Ellen she was "dead meat," in apparent retaliation for her 
asking him not to smoke marijuana outside her bedroom window (R. 359:49-51). 
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"/ heard him say that they was going to stab me" 
On 9 August 1999, at about 12:30 a.m., Ellen was in her bed when she heard 
someone outside her bedroom window state that "they" were going to "stab" her (R. 
359:47, 70). She then heard someone come through the kitchen window (R. 359:47, 52, 
67). Ellen thought to herself, "This is it" (R. 359:52). 
The next thing Ellen knew there was someone in the bedroom: "I real quick said 
- - trying to put him off guard I said, 'What are you doing in my bedroom, Robert?'" (R. 
359:52).l The intruder hesitated long enough for Ellen to swing her legs down off the 
side of the hospital bed in which she slept (R. 359:53). Ellen suffers from diabetes, a 
damaged spine and other chronic illnesses (R. 359:64). By the time the intruder reached 
her, Ellen was sitting up in bed facing him (id.). He attacked and struggled with Ellen, 
leaving her with several lacerations on her right scalp, under her right eye and on the 
right shoulder and breast area (R. 359:53-54,191-192). Ellen exclaimed, "Help me. 
Jehovah, help me," and "kicked with everything [she] had" (R. 359:54-55). Ellen was 
not able to scratch or otherwise strike her assailant because she "had to hold his hands 
with [her] hands to keep him from stabbing her" (R. 359:87). 
"[TJhey stabbed me" 
The assailant immediately ceased the attack and fled down the hall to the front 
door (R. 359:55-58). Finding that he was unable to open the locked the door, the 
Robert is Ellen's son who shared the two-bedroom apartment with her (R. 359:). 
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assailant grabbed a nearby chair and used it to climb out the kitchen window (R. 359:55-
58, 88). Ellen screamed to her son, "Robert, they stabbed me" (R. 359: 59). She also 
called the police (id.). 
Ellen was not able to identify her assailant that night (R. 3 59:101). She did, 
however, tell Officer Holdaway that her assailant "smelled" like a "Hispanic guy" she 
had had problems with in the past (R. 359:102). 
"You are dead meat" 
In addition to having confronted defendant about the smell of his marijuana, Ellen 
had another confrontation with defendant about one week prior to the burglary and attack 
in her apartment. Specifically, a group of Hispanic people, including defendant, gathered 
around a truck with a camper shell parked near Ellen's bedroom window (R. 359:61-62) 
(see Exh. #6). Some of the people lived in the same fourplex as Ellen and defendant, 
while others did not (R. 359:93-94). Ellen heard some of the men in the group telling 
two girls "what they were going to do and who they were going to do it with and they 
weren't using nice language" (R. 359:62). Specifically, "[t]hey told the girls they was 
going to have intercourse and who they was going to have it with . . .[o]nly that's not the 
words they used" (id.). The girls screamed, "No," and "bawlfed] for awhile instead of 
leaving" (id.). This behavior continued for 3-4 hours before Ellen screamed out her 
bedroom window, "If you don't cut it out and stop that filthy language and let me rest for 
a minute, I'm going to call the police" (id.). Ellen opened her curtain and saw that "they" 
6 
were "pelting little tiny gravel rocks" at her window (id.). Defendant said to her, "You 
are dead meat" (id.). 
Defendant's Fingerprints Found inside Ellen's Apartment 
Officer Wathen processed the crime scene that night (R. 359:110-121). He spread 
magnetic powder to detect latent fingerprints at the point of entry, Ellen's kitchen 
window (R. 359:121). Although he found nothing of use on the kitchen counter, he did 
find fingerprints that "jumped right out" on the ceramic tiles below the window (R. 
359:123). He also found fingerprints on the kitchen window itself: "I saw a great set of 
prints on there that even without fingerprinting powder I could see had ridge detail on 
them" (R. 359:125-126) (see Exh. ##1-2). When asked if there is a difference between a 
fresh latent print and an older print, Officer Wathen explained that, based on his fifteen 
years experience, "when a print is fresh or recent, they seem to just jump out. There is 
very fine, ridge detailing. You can see the - - it is called 'minutia/ the lines" (R. 
359:114-115,135,155). Officer Wathen confirmed that the two sets of prints that he 
took "popped right up" (R. 359:155). 
Officer Burgon examined the latent prints found in Ellen's apartment and 
determined that they belonged to defendant (R. 359:203-207, 209) (see Exh. ## 1-2). 
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Defendant Admits Breaking and Entering the Apartment 
Detective Norton interrogated defendant at the Salt Lake County Jail on 5 October 
1999 with the assistance of two interpreters (R.360:220-223). The interrogation was 
recorded, but Det. Norton inadvertently erased the first portion of the interrogation, 
where defendant waived his Miranda rights, when he forgot to turn the tape over before 
using it again (R. 360:224) {see Exh. ##15-16 (microcassette and cassette recording of 
partial interrogation) {see also R. 359:167-168, 174-175). Det. Norton had the partial 
recording transcribed (R. 360:223) {see Exh. # 3) (a copy is contained in addendum A).2 
Defendant denied ever being in Ellen's apartment or assaulting anyone, until the 
subject of fingerprints was brought up (R. 360:227, 236). Then defendant admitted that 
he had been in the apartment approximately one and one/half months earlier, or about the 
time of these offenses, but claimed that the apartment was empty of persons and/or 
furniture (R. 360:227-228-231, 236).3 Defendant said he entered through the kitchen 
window and that he then unlocked the front door for a prostitute he had solicited {id.). 
According to defendant: "They went in there, did their thing and that was i f {id.). 
Defendant admitted knowing it was illegal to break in to the apartment to have sex with a 
2Defense witness Martha Hannan, a contract linguist, prepared the transcription of 
the interview that appears in Exh. #3 (PL. 260:255). Hannan agreed with the prosecutor's 
statement that her transcription was an accurate interpretation of the interview (R. 
360:264). 
3While defendant claimed the apartment was empty when he entered it one and 
one/half months earlier or approximately mid-August, Ellen had been living there since 
April 1999 (R. 359:44) (R. 360:269). 
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prostitute, but denied having anything to do with the attack on Ellen (R. 360:241). The 
interpreter's recall of defendant's statements was consistent with that of Det. Norton's 
(R. 359:176-178, 186). 
Defendant denied ever having a confrontation with Ellen or hanging around the 
camper parked behind the fourplex, but he admitted that he knew who Ellen was (R. 
360:230, 235, 242). He also admitted that he used to live at the fourplex (R. 360:236). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point L The crime of attempted depraved indifference murder does not exist in 
Utah. Nonetheless, no reversible error occurred in including an instruction on the 
depraved indifference alternative for the attempted murder because neither party 
presented evidence suggesting the attempted homicide was committed with less than an 
intentional mental state. Accordingly, the jury was also instructed on the alternatives of 
attempting to intentionally and knowingly causing the death of another, and attempting to 
cause serious bodily injury, committing an act clearly dangerous to human life. 
Moreover, the only issue at trial was identity. There is, consequently, no reasonable 
possibility that defendant was convicted of the nonexistent crime. 
Point II. The Trial Court did not commit plain error in not sua sponte ordering a 
continuance and/or excluding Officer Wathen's opinion as to whether a one-year-old 
fingerprint would "pop up," where after complaining that he was not given notice that 
Officer Wathen would testify as a fingerprint expert, defendant failed to request either 
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remedy. Indeed, defendant suffered no harm because Officer Wathen's opinion as to the 
freshness of the prints found was merely cumulative of other unobjected to evidence. 
Point HI. The trial court did not plainly err in not declaring a mistrial based on its 
own conduct. Defendant fails to establish any error, let alone obvious error, in the trial 
court's management of the witness interrogations. In any event, the final jury 
instructions cured any possible error and/or prejudice resulting from the trial court's 
remarks here. 
Point IV. The record discloses that the trial court properly considered all the 
statutory requirements before exercising its wide sentencing discretion to impose 
consecutive sentences for defendant's aggravated burglary and attempted homicide 
convictions. The consecutive sentences should therefore be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ANY ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE DEPRAVED 
INDIFFERENCE ALTERNATIVE, FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER 
WAS HARMLESS BECAUSE NEITHER PARTY PRESENTED 
EVIDENCE SUGGESTING THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED 
WITH LESS THAN AN INTENTIONAL MENTAL STATE 
In State v. Huston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993) (per curiam), the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed a conviction for attempted second degree murder because the jury was 
instructed on attempted depraved indifference murder, a crime the supreme court had 
previously determined did not exist in Utah. Id. (citing State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 
10 
(Utah 1992)). In Point I of his brief, absent any discussion or comparison of the facts of 
this case to those in Huston, defendant asserts that the same result should obtain here. 
Aplt. Br. at 25-26. 
Defendant is correct that instructing a jury on the non-existent crime of attempted 
depraved indifference murder is error. However, giving an incorrect attempted depraved 
indifference instruction may be harmless error. See State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988, 991-
992 (Utah App. 1993). The facts of the instant case establish that Tinoco, not Haston, 
controls, and the error here was harmless. 
Proceedings Below. The State charged defendant with attempted criminal 
homicide, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (1999) 
(R. 3) (emphasis added) (a copy of the information is contained in addendum B). The 
information specified that "defendant, [], a party to the offense, attempted to intentionally 
or knowingly cause the death of Ellen Kuhel" (id.).4 Although the information did not 
include the depraved indifference alternative, and the State did not rely heavily on that 
alternative as a theory of prosecution in its closing argument (see R. 360:286, 290), it 
was nonetheless included in the elements instruction for attempted criminal homicide, 
and was also defined in two other instructions (R. 304-308) (copies of pertinent jury 
instructions are contained in addendum C), over defendant's objection (R. 360:281). 
4While subsections (a) and (b) of section 76-5-203 require an intentional or 
knowing act, subsection (c), the depraved indifference alternative, merely requires a 
reckless act. See Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 991-992. 
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A. This Case is Not Haston Revisited Because Unlike 
Defendant, Haston Acted With Less Than an Intentional 
Mental State 
This Court has previously distinguished Haston on the same grounds that it is 
distinguishable here. See Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 991. Unlike Tinoco and this case, there 
was evidence that Haston acted with less than an intentional mental state. Specifically, 
Haston shot his victim "in the chest at close range during a drunken quarrel" Haston, 
846 P.2d at 1277 n.l (emphasis added). Therefore, the evidence in Haston would have 
supported a conclusion that, "while [Haston] did not intend or know his actions would 
cause death, firing a gun during a drunken quarrel was a reckless act." Tinoco, 860 P.2d 
at 991. "Thus, it was possible Haston was convicted of a nonexistent crime." Id. 
B. This Case is More Properly Analogized to Tinoco Because 
Both Defendant and Tinoco Acted Intentionally 
Like defendant, Tinoco tried to rely on Haston in claiming that his conviction 
should be reversed. Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 991. Like Haston, the facts of Tinoco's case 
also involved drinking; specifically, Tinoco was drinking beer with two buddies in his 
home when he shot one of them in the arm. Id. at 989. However, unlike Haston, Tinoco 
claimed that he did so in self-defense. Id. According to his victim, on the other hand, 
"he (the victim) was leaving the house, believing [Tinoco] and [the other man] were 
going to fight, when [Tinoco] deliberately shot him." Id. Tinoco was charged with 
attempted criminal homicide, but was convicted for the lesser included offense of 
aggravated assault. Id. 
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On appeal, Tinoco argued that "the trial court failed to appropriately instruct the 
jury on the need for an intentional or knowing mental state to find him guilty of assault 
under one subsection of the statue." Id. Tinoco further argued that as a consequence, the 
instructions allowed the jury to convict him of reckless attempted aggravated assault, a 
nonexistent crime. Id. This Court pointed out, however, that Tinoco "admitted that he 
did the act necessary to constitute assault, i.e., he intentionally shot the victim, though he 
claimed in self-defense." Id. at 992. Therefore, "[o]n the uncontested facts, and the 
instructions on the law given to it, the jury could not have convicted [Tinoco] of an 
assault under the attempt section, but rather necessarily convicted him under [] the 
completed act section." Id. Thus, the Court concluded there was no "reasonable 
possibility" that Tinoco had been "'incarcerated for a crime which is not recognized in 
Utah.'" Id. (citing Haston, 846 P.2d at 1277). 
This case is more analogous to Tinoco than to Haston. As in Tinoco, there is no 
"reasonable possibility" that defendant was convicted for a nonexistent crime, in this 
case attempted depraved indifference murder. The evidence established solely 
intentional misconduct, with no hint of a lesser mental state. Specifically, after Ellen 
confronted defendant about smoking marijuana outside her bedroom window, he 
frequently told her she was "dead meat," and he subsequently broke into her apartment 
and attacked her in her bed with a knife (see, e.g., R. 359:49-59, 62, 78, 123-126, 203-
207). Defendant's defense was not about mental state, but identity (see, e.g., R. 360:291-
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317). Ellen's testimony established, and defendant did not dispute, that her attacker 
acted intentionally. The only real issue for the jury was whether that assailant was 
defendant (R. 360:291-317). Based on Ellen's identification and the fingerprint 
evidence, the jury convicted him as charged (R. 321). 
Based on the evidence adduced, no facts even a "theoretical possibility of a 
conviction for a legally impossible crime." Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 992. Thus, the Court 
should reject defendant's claim of Haston-type reversible error.5 See also State v. 
Payne, 964 P.2d 327,333 (Utah App. 1998) ("[Reversal is inappropriate when, for 
example, compelling evidence supports the defendant's conviction."). 
defendant's nominal reliance on State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1159 (Utah 
1991), is as unavailing as his reliance on Haston. Johnson involved a conviction for 
attempted first degree murder. Id. The problem in Johnson was that the evidence as to 
one of the aggravating circumstances elevating the conviction from second to first degree 
murder was insufficient and the jury verdict did not specify upon which aggravating 
circumstance its first degree verdict was based. Id. at 1157-1159. The supreme court 
reiterated the Utah rule that, "a jury must be unanimous on all elements of criminal 
charge, and that a general verdict of guilty cannot stand if the State's case was premised 
on more than one factual or legal theory of the elements of the crime and any one of 
those theories is flawed or lacks the requisite evidentiary foundation," and accordingly 
reversed Johnson's conviction. Id. at 1159. 
As set forth in the body of this point, in contrast to Johnson, the only issue here 
was the identity of the perpetrator and the evidence accordingly supported only one 
theory, i.e., intentional attempted homicide. Thus, there is no possible confusion as to 
whether the jury could have convicted based on a inadequate theory or factual basis. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
"FAILING" TO ORDER A CONTINUANCE WHERE, AFTER 
COMPLAINING THAT HE WAS NOT GIVEN "NOTICE" THAT 
OFFICER WATHEN WOULD TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT, 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO REQUEST ONE 
In Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant contends that the trial court erred in "failing" 
to order a continuance after defendant objected on "notice"grounds to the prosecutor's 
attempt on redirect to elicit Officer Wathen's opinion on the tendency of a one-year-old 
latent fingerprint to "pop up." Aplt. Br. at 36-37. In Point 11(B) of his brief, defendant 
contends that the trial court erred in "failing" to exclude the officer's opinion. Aplt. Br. 
at 37-39. Defendant acknowledges that the plain error standard applies at most to his 
claim that the trial court should have ordered a continuance sua sponte. See Aplt. Br. at 
36-37. As neither remedy was requested below, however, defendant cannot prevail on 
appeal absent a demonstration that the trial court plainly erred in "failing" to order either 
a continuance and/or exclusion sua sponte. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah 1993). Therefore, because defendant fails to assert the plain error standard with 
respect to his exclusion claim, that issue is waived and will not be further addressed here. 
See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to address waived 
issue in the absence of any assertion of plain error); State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 705 
n.2 (Utah App. 1993) (same). 
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Proceedings Below. On direct examination of Officer Wathen, who collected the 
latent fingerprints from Ellen's kitchen, the prosecutor inquired, without objection: "Is 
there a difference between, say, a latent print that is fresh versus something that might be 
older in time?" (R. 359:114, 121-126) {see Exh. ##1-2). When Officer Wathen 
responded affirmatively, the prosecutor further inquired, without objection, as to the 
officer's "opinion"on that difference (id.). Officer Wathen responded that a "fresh print" 
has a "crisp" appearance, meaning, "'It pops up . . . I guess the easiest thing to explain is 
that when a print is fresh or recent, they seem to just jump out. There is very fine, ridge 
detailing. You can see the - - it is call 'minutia,' the lines."(/i/.). The prosecutor then 
asked, without objection, whether a one-week-old fingerprint would be considered an 
"older print" (id.). Officer Wathen replied that it was all "relative" and that it would be 
possible to produce "some level of quality" (R. 359:115). He also reiterated that in his 
"experience . . . the most recent fingerprints have very fine details and they pop right out" 
(id.). 
After establishing the difference between fresh and old prints, the prosecutor 
inquired regarding the prints found in Ellen's kitchen (R. 359:121-123). Officer Wathen 
described the prints he found on the ceramic tiles below the kitchen window: "And as I 
went along, there was one particular fingerprint that just - - it just jumped right out. The 
only way I can describe it is it looked as if I took my own finger and put it on and pulled 
it away and hit it with a brush. It just came right up" (R. 359:123). Officer Wathen also 
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described the fingerprints he found on the kitchen window itself: "I took my flashlight, 
held it up to the window at an angle, and, again, boy, I saw a great set of prints on there 
that even without fingerprint powder I could see had ridge detail on them" (R. 359:126). 
On cross, defense counsel inquired further about "fingerprints that jump out" (R. 
359:132). Specifically, defense counsel stated: "You talked about fingerprints that jump 
out, and I take it there are fingerprints that don't jump out at you. But the fact of the 
matter is that fingerprints can last a long time somewhere; correct?" (id.). Officer 
Wathen agreed (R. 359:133). Further cross examination established that prints can 
conceivably last "years" on hard surfaces such as glass and tile (id.). Defense counsel 
then delved into the subject of prints "'jumping out/ 'popping out'": 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: You talked a little about some - -1 want to stay on the 
subject for a second of- - of this 'jumping out,' 
'popping out,' I think is what you said? 
OFFICER WATHEN: Yes, sir. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I take it that your notions of freshness are sort of 
subjective? 
OFFICER WATHEN: Define that, please? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: 
OFFICER WATHEN: 
They are based on your experience, your perceptions. 
Something seems to happen with that dust that makes 
you think, 'Yeah, that's a good print'? 
Well, normally, when I go to process a scene,.. . for 
an example in a vehicle burglary,... we will check 
certain areas, the doors and that, and when we don't 
find any fingerprints, we start to ask ourselves - -
usually I do this on every case - - 'Why don't I find 
any?' So I will find a spot on a vehicle or in a 
residence or wherever and I will roll my own fingers 
17 
on that, and then I start to check it. And that's when I 
refer to - - that the 'prints popped right up,' it has been 
my personal experience, I always see that occur under 
those circumstances. 
You can recover fingerprints off items that are very, 
very old; however, normally you don't use this 
fingerprint powder technique. Normally it is with an 
alternate light source or maybe a flourescent powder 
and took [sic] a photograph, and then it's reversed 
and/or maybe a digital type thing like this. What I was 
speaking [sic] is normally with a powder, whether it's 
volcanic or bichromic, which is just a different 
variation of powder, they seem - - and it's just been 
my personal experience that they normally are very 
pronounced and they just jump right out. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Since you are talking about the moisture interplay, 
condensation may make them seem light or may make 
the powder stick and make them jump out; fair to say? 
OFFICER WATHEN: Very. Yes. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And when we are talking about this period of time - -
and, like you say, sometimes you might want to use a 
different technique if you think you are looking at a 
real old print; right? 
OFFICER WATHEN: Well, normally what I try to do is always use the least 
intrusive means - -1 should say the second least 
intrusive, first being photograph where you don't 
disrupt or touch anything. You try to use the normal 
fingerprint powders, just the regular volcanic, what 
call "bichromic"; because it's just simple to apply, you 
put the powder on your brush and you go over the 
print, you either get it or you don't. 
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DEFENSE COUNSEL: 
If you can see that you have a print there and - - but 
you are not getting the results you want because it is 
not adhering to the print because maybe it is old and 
there is no more moisture in it, then you want to go to 
one of the alternate means to recover that or capture it. 
So you could try others after if you weren't 
successful? 
OFFICER WATHEN: You would be negligent if you didn't. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Fair enough. You were successful with the 
first method that you used; right? 
OFFICER WATHEN: Yes, sir. 
(R. 359:134-136) (emphasis added). 
On redirect examination, the prosecutor sought to clarify, without objection, 
whether the sets of prints lifted from Ellen's kitchen {see Exh. ##1-2) "popped right up?" 
(R. 359:155). Officer Wathen responded affirmatively (id.). The prosecutor then 
inquired whether it was Officer Wathen's experience and training that a one-year-old 
print would "pop up?", drawing the first objection to this line of inquiry from defense 
counsel (R. 359:155-156). Defense counsel objected on grounds of "foundation" and 
lack of "notice" that Officer Wathen "would be an expert on the time and place of the 
fingerprints" (id.). 
The trial court denied the objection, ruling that Officer Wathen had been 
established as an expert (id.). Defense counsel agreed, but persisted that defendant did 
not get "notice that the State would attempt to make such a conclusion with this witness" 
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(id.). The trial court responded: "It was gone into, was it not, the question of 'pop up' 
was gone into on cross-examination?" (id.). Defense counsel stated that he had done so 
"[b]ecause it was elicited on direct, yes, Your Honor, only to clarify it" (id.). The trial 
court overruled the objection (id.). 
Thereafter the prosecutor elicited Officer Wathen's opinion that a one-year-old 
print would not "pop up . . . as quickly and as pronounced as it did in this particular 
occasion" (R. 359:157). 
A. The Trial Court Committed No Error, Let Alone Obvious 
Error, in "Failing" to Order Unrequested Relieif 
As noted previously, in Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant asserts that he was 
"surprised" when the prosecutor attempted to elicit Officer Wathen's expert opinion as to 
whether a one-year-old print would "pop up." Aplt. Br. at 27-37. Defendant contends 
that he was therefore entitled to a continuance under the expert witness notification 
statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-17-13(4)(a) (1999), and that the trial court committed 
plain error in not ordering a continuance sua sponte. Aplt. Br. at 36-37. 
To establish plain error defendant must show "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellantf.]" 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. Failure to meet any one of the requirements defeats 
defendant's claim. Id. Here, defendant's plain error claim fails because he cannot 
demonstrate any error on the part of the trial court. 
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In the absence of a timely request for any relief defendant is hard-pressed to 
demonstrate that the trial court should have ordered a continuance sua sponte, and that 
the "failure" to do so was error, let alone obvious error. Indeed, "[wjhen the prosecution 
introduces unexpected testimony, a defendant 'essentially waive[s] his right to later claim 
error' if the defendant fails to request a continuance or seek other appropriate relief under 
Rule 16(g)[, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure]." State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518, 522 
(Utah App. 1998) (quoting, State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1989)). See also 
State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1169 n.2 (Utah App. 1998) (noting the similarity 
between discovery claims raised under section 77-17-13, and Rule 16(g)). 
Here, the expert witness notification statute does indeed require the State to give 
at least 30 days notice before trial of any expert witness. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-17-
13(l)(a) (1999). While such notice was provided with regard to Det. Burgeon, it was not 
provided with regard to Officer Wathen's opinion here {see R. 159). Further, section 77-
17-13(4)(a) of the statute does provide that "[i]f the defendant or the prosecution fails to 
meet the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a 
continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony." 
Contrary to defendant's suggestion, however, subsection (4)(a) does not mandate 
that the trial court shall order a continuance any time the discovery statute is violated 
even if no continuance is requested by the aggrieved party. Id. Indeed, there are many 
reasons an aggrieved party may not desire a continuance, and subsection (4)(a) does not 
place the onus of divining the aggrieved party's strategy on the trial court. Id. In the 
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present case, for example, defense counsel acknowledged that he had explored the 
unobjected-to "pop up" testimony on cross examination for clarification purposes (R. 
359:156) (see also R. 359:132-137). 
If defendant truly desired a subsection (4)(a) continuance, he should have timely 
requested one for the reasons he articulates for the first time in his appellate brief. See 
Aplt. Br. at 30. Had defendant argued such circumstances when the prosecutor first 
broached the topic of Officer Wathen's expertise in detecting the freshness of a latent 
print on direct examination {see R. 359:114-115), he may have arguably sufficiently 
demonstrated his entitlement to a continuance. See, e.g., State v. Tolano, 2001 UT App 
37, f 3, 11-14, Utah Adv. Rep. (holding that trial court abused its discretion 
when it denied Tolano's requested continuance); State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 
(Utah App. 1997) (recognizing that "[t]he decision to grant or deny a requested 
continuance lies within the broad discretion of the trial court[,]"and holding that trial 
court exceeded its discretion in refusing to grant the requested relief). 
Based on the above, precisely because defendant failed to seek a continuance, or 
"to devise any means of dealing with [Officer Wathen's] unexpected testimony," 
Rugebregt, 965 P.2d at 522, any resulting error may well have been invited. See State v. 
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 1996) (holding that parties should be discouraged 
from intentionally misleading the trial court "so as to preserve a hidden ground for 
reversal on appeal"). See also Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220 ("A party cannot take advantage 
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of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the 
error.").6 
B. Defendant Suffered No Harm Because Officer Wathen's 
Opinion was Merely Cumulative of Other Unobjected-to 
Evidence 
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in not sua sponte ordering a 
continuance, any possible error was harmless because the complained of evidence is 
merely cumulative of other previously admitted and unobjected-to evidence. See, e.g., 
State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah App. 1997) (rejecting claim of prejudicial 
error and recognizing that defendant waived any right to an instruction limiting jury's 
consideration of his statements for impeachment purposes where defendant's statements 
had also been admitted in the State's substantive case-in-chief without objection). 
In claiming prejudice, defendant attacks Officer Wathen's response to a single 
question on redirect, that a one-year-old print would not "pop up" as "quickly" and as 
"pronounced" as had the instant prints {see R. 359:157). See Aplt. Br. at 27-37. 
However, this evidence had essentially already been admitted. Indeed, defendant did not 
raise his "notice" objection until after the difference between fresh and old prints had 
been explored without objection by the prosecutor on direct and initial redirect (see R. 
6If the need for a sua sponte continuance order should have been obvious to the 
trial court, it should have also been obvious to trial counsel. See State v. Labrum, 881 
P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 1994) (observing that a "claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel typically is raised in conjunction with alleging plain error," because if "the error 
was plain to the court, it should also have been plain to trial counsel"), overruled on 
other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). However, defendant makes no claim that 
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a continuance or any other relief. 
See Aplt. Br. at 27-37. 
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359:114-115, 123, 125-126,). By the time the time defendant objected to the 
prosecutor's query on redirect, whether a one-year-old print would "pop up," the 
unobjected-to evidence established that fresh prints "pop up," and that the prints found in 
Ellen's kitchen "popped up" (R.359:l 14-115, 123-126, 155). In other words, they 
appeared as if Officer Wathen himself had just placed them there (R. 359:123). 
Cross examination further clarified that older prints are not generally detected 
with dusting powder, and that Officer Wathen succeeded in lifting the prints in Exh. ##1-
2 with dusting powder, suggesting they were not old (R. 359:134-136). Cross 
examination also established that prints can conceivably last "years" and delved into the 
environmental conditions under which prints would and would not "pop up" (see R. 
359:132-136). 
Finally, as defendant admitted to breaking into the apartment approximately one 
and one/half months prior to his October 1999 statement to Det. Norton, or at the 
approximate time of the burglary and attack (see R.360:227-228, 231, 236 ), the 
prosecutor's focus on the difference between a recent and a one year old print was barely 
relevant. 
Based on the above, Officer Wathen's opinion on redirect, that a one-year-old 
print would not "pop up" like the instant prints, was merely cumulative of previously 
adduced and unobjected-to evidence, including the officer's observation that the 
fingerprints popped up so clearly that it was as if he himself had just made them. 
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Given these circumstances, defendant fails to show any harm and his plain error claim 
can be rejected on that ground alone. See State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313,317 (Utah 
1998). 
POINT HI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN NOT 
DECLARING A MISTRIAL BASED ON ITS OWN CONDUCT 
In Point IV of his brief, defendant claims that the trial court "disproportionately 
criticized defense counsel's handling of the trial," as compared to the prosecutor, as well 
as interjected comments and asked questions designed to bolster prosecution witnesses 
and undermine a defense witness. Aplt. Br. at 40-44. Therefore, defendant broadly 
claims, he is entitled to "retrial before a new judge." Aplt. Br. at 47. Defendant 
acknowledges that he failed to raise any objection to the tenor of the trial court's alleged 
unfair conduct below, but suggests that he was not obliged to do so as any objection 
would have been "futile or vain,"and also "would have simply entrenched and agitated 
the trial judge." Aplt. Br. at 45-46. 
Alternatively, defendant asserts that the trial court's alleged unfairness was so 
"obvious" as to constitute plain error. Aplt. Br. at 46. As defendant's suggestion that he 
can escape the requirements of the plain error standard because he is challenging the trial 
court's conduct is unfounded, the State's analysis proceeds solely under that standard. 
The cases defendant cites do not support his suggestion that an appellant attacking 
the conduct of the trial court is excused from otherwise applicable preservation 
requirements. For example, Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892 (Utah App. 1996) (Billings, 
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J. dissenting), cert, denied, 936 P.2d 407 (Utah 1997), is an adoption case where the 
majority determined the putative father was ''statutorily precluded from maintaining any 
action to assert any interest in the child, based on his failure to file a notice of paternity in 
this State." Id. at 895. The dissent, upon which defendant relies, merely observes that as 
the putative father had filed an action in another state, and had otherwise informed the 
mother and LDS Social Services of his desire to have custody of the child, a late filing of 
the notice would have been futile. Id. at 900 (Billings, J., dissenting). Further, Roundy 
v. Staley, 1999 UT App 229, 984 P.2d 404, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999), 
involves a discovery issue where the plaintiff moved to compel the disclosure of the 
witness and other evidence pretrial, which motion the trial court "unequivocally denied." 
Id. at [^6. In a split decision, a single judge deemed the motion to compel sufficiently 
analogous to an admissibility objection as to render further objection at trial "futile." Id. 
(Greenwood, J., lead opinion). Finally, State v. Eldredge, 713 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989), recites the plain error requirements and the underlying 
purpose of the doctrine, and notes no exception thereto for challenges to the trial court's 
conduct. 
As previously set forth in Point [I, to establish plain error defendant must show 
"(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome[.]" Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. Failure to meet any one of the requirements 
defeats defendant's claim. Id. Here, defendant's allegations of impartiality fail to 
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demonstrate any error, let alone obvious error, in the trial court's management of the 
witness interrogations. Moreover, any arguable error was cured by the trial court's 
instructions to the jury. 
A. The Trial Court Committed No Error, Obvious or 
Otherwise, in Managing the Witness Interrogations 
Defendant cites approximately 30 instances in the record where the trial court 
interrupted either the prosecutor or defense counsel, but complains that a 
disproportionate number of these interruptions (19) reflected unfairly on defense counsel. 
Aplt. Br. at 40-41. Specifically, defendant claims the trial court "objected to defense 
counsel's handling of witnesses" and otherwise "rushed defense counsel" through his 
examinations. See Aplt. Br. at 40-41. However, defendant discusses only two of the 
cited 19 incidents in his brief, one of which occurred outside the presence of the jury.7 
7See Aplt. Br. at 41 (citing R. 360:278-280), where defendant complains that the 
trial court told defense counsel to "get on with it" after defense counsel informed the trial 
court he had more objections to the jury instructions. The full exchange proceeded as 
follows: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: . . . Your Honor. With regard to the elements instruction of 
Attempted - -
THE COURT: Let's have the Jury brought in. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: There are a few more. 
THE COURT: Well, let's move it on, then. We are kind of fumbling around 
here. You are - - you need to make your exceptions so we 
can get on with it. 
(R. 360:280) (emphasis added). Viewed in context, the trial court's comment was not 
entirely directed at defense counsel. Moreover, because it was made outside the presence 
of the jury, even assuming it was unnecessarily brusque, the comment cannot be said to 
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The other allegedly unfair incident defendant highlights from his string cite of 19, 
is the trial court's relevancy ruling which precluded defense counsel from eliciting 
testimony from Officer Holdaway, during the State's case-in-chief, regarding prostitution 
activity in the vicinity of the crime scene. Aplt. Br. at 43 (citing R. 359:108). The 
exchange between defense counsel and the trial court went as follows: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Some prostitution in that general part of the city? 
THE COURT: I don't see where that is relevant, Counsel. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: It is, Your Honor 
THE COURT: Prostitution? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: 
THE PROSECUTOR: 
Yes, Your Honor, and the fact that this case involves the 
statement of the Defendant that when he was in the 
apartment, he was in there engaging in an act with a 
prostitute. 
Judge, again, if Counsel is asking him about that, if we are 
not close to this time frame, I would object to the bases - -
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Let me ask -
THE COURT: I don't see any relevance to it, Counsel. I am going to sustain 
the objection. I don't think that - the Defendant can tell his 
story when he gets an opportunity, I suppose.8 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Corroborate -
have prejudiced defendant and will not be fiirther analyzed here. See Marvin, 964 P.2d 
at 317 ("If there is no prejudice, we have no reason to reach the other elements of the 
(plain error) analysis"). See also State v. Jasper, 759 So.2d 1136, 1139 (Miss. 1999) (no 
reversible error where trial court's actions were outside the presence of the jury). 
8Defendant complains for the first time on appeal that this was an improper 
comment on his right to testify. Aplt. Br. at 44-45. However, any arguable error or 
prejudice was cured by the jury instructions discussed in subpoint (B) supra. 
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THE COURT: / am not persuaded at this point that there is any reason to go 
into prostitution in any portion of the city. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I am only trying to establish whether or not - -
THE COURT: I understand what you are trying to establish. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: - - happens there. 
THE COURT: I am ruling that it's inadmissible, inappropriate. 
(R. 359:108-109) (emphasis added). 
In addition to his complaint about the trial court's alleged unfair tenor in 
delivering the above ruling, defendant complains that the trial court substantively erred in 
precluding him from introducing relevant evidence to corroborate his defense theory, i.e., 
that he left his fingerprints in Ellen's apartment during an earlier, unrelated, illicit entry 
to have sex with a prostitute. Aplt. Br. at 44. As can be seen from the ruling itself, 
however, defendant was not entirely precluded from adducing corroborative evidence of 
prostitution activity in the area. The trial court's statement, "I am not persuaded at this 
point" (R. 359:108), reasonably suggests that it might have been amenable to this line of 
inquiry during presentation of the defense case. In any event, the corroborative value of 
such testimony is negligible. Whether defendant was able to solicit the alleged prostitute 
locally, or whether he brought her back to the fourplex from another location, the more 
salient and undisputed fact was that defendant lived in the same fourplex as Ellen at the 
time of these offenses (R. 359:93-94; R. 360:236). 
Defendant highlights two other incidents which are not included in his record 
string cites on pp. 40-41 of his brief. Specifically, defendant complains that after defense 
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counsel asked for a bathroom break, the trial court responded, "We'll grant a favor to 
Counsel this one time . . . Ten minutes, Mr. Williams[,]" see Aplt. Br. at 41 (quoting R. 
359:109), and that the trial court instructed the interpreter to wait to finish interpreting 
the jury instructions for defendant until after he had interpreted the closing arguments 
then underway, see Aplt. Br. at 41 (citing R. 360:283-284). 
One of the difficulties faced by counsel and the Court in analyzing defendant's 
claims of impartiality in these and the other complained of incidents is that the tenor of 
the trial court's conduct is not obvious from the cold record. Moreover, because 
defendant did not object to the tenor of the court's comments below through either a 
mistrial or new trial motion, the trial court had no opportunity to rule on the tenor of his 
conduct. Further, adverse rulings by themselves do not necessarily indicate bias or 
partiality. See State v. Davis, 607 N.E.2d 543, 546 (Ohio App. 1992). The result is that, 
defendant's claims to the contrary, on this record the highlighted incidents above more 
obviously illustrate the trial court's warranted concern about "avoiding] needless 
consumption of time." Utah R. Evid. 611(a) ("[t]he court shall exercise reasonable 
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as 
to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, 
(2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or 
undue embarrassment"). 
The undiscussed record cites on pp. 40-41 of defendant's brief describe equally 
benign judicial conduct. Specifically, the incidents complained of in those cites involve 
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nothing more than the trial court's clarifying defense counsel's questions for the benefit 
of the witnesses, and/or the witnesses' responses for the benefit of defense counsel {see, 
e.g., (R. 359:75-76, 142-143, 152) (R. 360:235, 241, 247, 266)). 
In addition to clarifying the proceedings, the rulings in the undiscussed record 
cites are not clearly adverse to defendant. For example, one of the cites consists of the 
trial court interrupting to remind a prosecution witness what question defense counsel 
was asking, after the witness's lengthy response strayed from the point {see R. 359:160). 
Even defense counsel acknowledged that several of the trial court's interventions were 
"Fair enough" or "Fine" {see, e.g.,R. 360:235, 247, 251). Further, while the trial court 
sustained one of the prosecutor's "leading" objections, he did so by summarizing the 
witness's testimony favorably to defendant's theory {see R. 360:258). Defense counsel 
accordingly responded affirmatively: "And that is just what I was going to try to get her 
to say, Judge. So, if that is the state of the evidence, I am fine with moving on" (id.). 
Finally, the trial court also overruled the prosecutor's "asked and answered"objection to 
defense counsel's cross examination (see R. 359:182-183). 
The above incidents are examples of the trial court's "firm control"of the 
proceedings, and they all "fall well within the reasonable bounds within which a trial 
judge may act." Cooper v. United States, 403 F.2d 71, 73 (10th Cir.1968) (upholding 
conviction where trial court characterized defense counsel statement as "ridiculous," and 
questioned the relevancy of defense counsel's cross-examination of a government 
witness). 
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Even if the trial court can be fairly characterized as unnecessarily curt at times, 
such curtness is insufficient to establish any error. Indeed, while "[jjudicial decorum and 
restraint are always goals, [] comments which cause disappointment, discomfort, or 
embarrassment to counsel in the presence of the jury, without more, rarely constitute 
deprivation of a fair trial." People v. Coria, 937 P.2d 386, 391 (Colo. 1997) (upholding 
conviction over challenge to trial court's "unnecessary" response to defendants objection 
to prosecutor's closing argument: "Counsel, you know that's proper. You're just 
objecting to interrupt his flow and your objection is overruled."). See also United States 
v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614, 621(10th Cir. 1984) (although the court's comments were "brusk 
and disturbing" to counsel, the matters mentioned were but "minor incidents" not 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985); 
United States v. Rosen field, 545 F.2d 98, 103 (10th Cir. 1976) (no error when trial court 
interrupted defense closing argument to correct what appeared to be an improper 
argument and then admonished defense counsel in the presence of the jury), cert, denied, 
430 U.S. 941 (1977). 
Defendant's allegations of unfair bolstering of prosecution witnesses and 
undermining of a defense witness are similarly meritless. Aplt. Br. at 42-43. Contrary to 
defendant's allegation, no bolstering is apparent in the trial court's response to defense 
counsel's "foundation" and "notice" objection to Officer Wathen's testifying as an expert 
(R. 359:156). Indeed, the trial court ruled as follows: 
Well, Counsel, I believe that the gentleman's qualifications have been 
established that he is aware of and has done numerous fingerprint analyses 
32 
or at least crime-scene analyses. And I'm persuaded that he's able to give 
his opinion with regard to print viability after a period of a year or any 
other time period after that. He can answer. 
(id.). The trial court's ruling is nothing more than preservation of the basis for his ruling, 
not to mention a proper characterization of the disputed issue: whether, in the words of 
defense counsel, Officer Wathen was qualified to testify as an expert "on the time and 
place of the fingerprints" (id.) (emphasis added). 
Defendant also complains that the trial court unfairly bolstered the interpreter, 
Agent Earnst, when at the conclusion of the agent's testimony on direct, the trial court 
remarked: "He happened along, offered a good deed which has not gone unpunished; 
has it, Agent?" (R. 359:179). See Aplt. Br. at 42. Notably, defense counsel played upon 
the trial court's good humored observation when he began his cross examination of the 
agent: "As part of that good deed, did you take any notes?" (id.). The trial court's and 
defense counsel's comments amount to no more than "trivial pleasantries]," and in no 
manner constitute error, let alone, obvious error on the part of the trial court. State v. 
Keenan, 689 N.E.2d 929, 944 (Ohio) (characterizing trial judge's reference to prosecutor 
in the presence of the venire as a "rising star" as a "trivial pleasantry" and holding that 
such "could hardly be plain error"), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 860 (1998). 
Defendant's allegation that the trial court undermined defense witness Martha 
Hannan is equally lacking in merit. The trial court merely asked Hannan (who testified 
that the language skills of the two interpreters that assisted Det. Norton were less than 
stellar), whether she had "any independent knowledge of [defendant's] ability to use the 
33 
English language . . . ? " (R. 360:266). See Aplt. Br. at 42-43. Defendant claims the 
question unfairly undermined Hannan's opinion that defendant * 'appeared not to 
understand English." Aplt. Br. at 43. However, Hannan expressed no such opinion. 
Rather, the most that can be said is that on cross by the prosecutor, Hannan read 
defendant's responses to the interviewers' indicating that defendant did think he 
(defendant) understood English very well (R. 360:262). Defense counsel's redirect 
established that defendant's responses were in Spanish {see R. 360:266). Therefore, the 
trial court's question can hardly be said to have undermined an opinion Hannan herself 
never rendered. 
In any event, as noted in State v. Mellen, 583 P.2d 46,48 (Utah 1978), cited by 
defendant, while the judge should "exercise restraint in examining witnesses," he 
does have a function beyond sitting as a comparatively silent monitor of the 
proceedings.... [I]t is within his prerogative to ask whatever questions of 
witnesses as in his judgment is necessary or desirable to clarify, explain or 
add to the evidence as it relates to the disputed issues. 
Id. The court's single question to Hannan here falls well within the permitted ambit of 
the above principle and in no manner undermined Hannan's credibility. Id. 
Based on the above, defendant fails to demonstrate error, let alone obvious error, 
in the trial court's management of the witness interrogations. His claim of plain error 
therefore fails. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. 
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B. The Jury Instructions Cured Any Arguable Error and/or 
Prejudice 
In any event, any arguable error in the trial court's interjections and comments 
here was cured by the final jury instructions. Jury Instructions ##6 and 31 instructed the 
jurors that they were not to be concerned with the reasons for any rulings the trial court 
made during the course of the trial, and that 
[t]he court has not intended to express, or intimate, or be understood as 
giving any opinion on what the proof shows or does not show, or what are 
or what are not the facts of the case. And it is immaterial what the court 
thinks thereon. You must follow your own views and not be influenced by 
the views of the court. 
(R. 285, 311), add. C. Further, to the extent the trial court can be said to have 
commented on defendant's right to testify, jury instruction #10 instructed that 
defendant's failure to testify here was a not a circumstance that could be held against him 
(R. 289), add. C. Defendant points to nothing in the record that would indicate the jury 
was unable to follow these instructions. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 
1998). 
Finally, none of the judicial conduct of which defendant's complains here, 
whether considered individually or in the aggregate, rises to the level of that condemned 
in People v. Vialpando, 809 P.2d 1082 (Colo. App. 1990), cert, denied, 825 P.2d 63 
(Colo. 1992), upon which defendant relies. Aplt. Br. at 47. Vialpando complained of 53 
incidents of judicial impropriety. Id. at 1084. On appeal, the Colorado court determined 
that not all of Vialpando's complaints were legitimate, but that a significant number were 
and reversed, in part, on that ground. Id. at 1083-1085. 
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Without going into specifics, the Vialpando court found that the trial judge there 
"demonstrated an attitude of prejudice against the defense" by making "numerous 
statements . . . evidencing his irritation and intolerance of defense questioning[,] . . . 
call[ing] into question the defenses' trial tactics, as well as several unnecessary 
comments and other disruptive remarks," and "seriously curtailed" Vialpando's "right to 
object to testimony or argument." Id. 
Additionally, the trial judge in Vialpando had complimented the prosecutor, but 
"accused (defense) counsel of attempting to 'trap these people into an answer'" during 
jury voir dire. Id. at 1084-1085. "In another instance, after the prosecution had made an 
inaccurate and incomplete statement of the law, defense counsel objected but was told to 
"sit down . . . you can correct that when you get up.'" Id. at 1085. The Vialpando trial 
judge also instructed the defense counsel "that she must write out her objections" to the 
prosecutor's closing argument, "to be acted upon at a later time." When Vialpando's 
counsel asked if the same rule applied to the prosecutor, the trial judge "gave no answer, 
but directed defense counsel to continue her argument." Id. 
Based on these and other irregularities in the Vialpando trial judge's handling of 
the case, including a failures to sequester the jury, to allow inquiry into the jury's 
exposure to out-of-court information, and to give statutorily required introductory 
instructions, the Vialpando court determined that Vialpando was entitled to a new trial. 
Id. at 1083-1085. 
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In sum, even assuming some unnecessary and/or curt remarks by the trial court 
here, they were not so prejudicial as those in Vialpando, nor were they so devastating as 
to vitiate the mitigating effect of instructions ##6, 10, and 31 (see R. 285, 289, 311), 
add, C. See Harmon, 956 P.2d at 273. See Davis, 607 N.E.2d at 547 ("Assuming some 
minimal prejudice from some of the trial court's comments and questions in the instant 
case, we are persuaded that its corrective instruction admonishing the jury to disregard an 
indication of its personal view of the evidence, sufficiently cured any error."). 
Defendant's plain error claim should be rejected for failure to demonstrate any prejudice. 
See Marvin, 964 P.2d at 317. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS WIDE 
SENTENCING DISCRETION TO IMPOSE CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCES FOR DEFENDANT'S AGGRAVATED BURGLARY 
AND ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE CONVICTIONS 
At the sentencing hearing in this case the trial court noted it had received and 
reviewed the presentence investigation report (PSI) (R. 361:4) (a complete copy of the 
sentencing transcript is contained in addendum D). The trial court also heard the 
prosecutor's characterization of the offenses as "egregious," and defense counsel's 
request that defendant be given credit for 236 days he had already served (R. 361:7), 
add. D. Thereafter, the trial court imposed sentence: 
Mr. Perez, having heard the evidence at the trial, I am persuaded that 
the jury verdict was correct, that indeed, Mr. Perez, the conduct in which 
you engaged was - - egregious; I guess is an appropriate term. Breaking 
into a little lady's home in the middle of the night and stabbing her with a 
knife, which of course is what the jury found you guilty of having done, in 
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my estimation in this civilized society cannot and will not be tolerated, Mr. 
Perez. 
Therefore, it is the judgment and sentence of this court that you be 
committed to the Utah State Prison forthwith to serve the term provided by 
law for the first degree felony of five years to life, and for the second 
degree felony of one to 15 years, and that those terms be served 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
As I am bound to do, I will grant you credit for the 236 days that 
have spent in custody awaiting disposition in these matters. 
(R. 361:8-9), add. D. 
In Point IV of his brief, defendant contends that the trial court abused its wide 
sentencing discretion by imposing the above consecutive terms. Aplt. Br. at 48. 
Specifically, defendant complains that the trial court focused "exclusively"on the nature 
and circumstances of his crimes, and did not consider his alleged "insignificant criminal 
history, stable background, and desire to better himself." Id. Defendant's claim lacks 
merit. 
When a defendant is found guilty of more than one felony, Utah law affords the 
trial court discretion to impose consecutive sentences. Indeed, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-
401(1) (1999) provides that "[a] court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged 
guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses." Further, Section 76-3-401(4) sets forth the factors which a 
trial court shall consider in deciding to impose consecutive terms. See also State v. 
Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358-59 (Utah App. 1996). That section provides that the court 
"shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, 
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and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive 
sentences." Section 76-3-401(4). However, Section 76-3-401(4) requires only that the 
court consider these factors, not that it give them equal weight. See State v. Nutall, 861 
P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) ("the trial court did not abuse its discretion by placing 
more emphasis on punishing defendant rather than rehabilitating him"). 
Here, as noted previously, before imposing consecutive terms, the trial court made 
plain that it had reviewed the PSI report (R. 361:4), add. D. The PSI report covers 
defendant's history, character, and rehabilitative needs, all of the criteria which defendant 
claims the trial court should have, but did not, consider. See PSI at 5-10. Moreover, the 
trial court was not bound by the recommendations from Adult Probation and Parole and 
the prosecutor for the imposition of concurrent terms. Cf. State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 
1296, 1302 (Utah App. 1989) ("[T]here is not reason to set aside a guilty plea if the court 
did not follow the prosecutor's recommendations, even if the defendant is disappointed 
with the severity of the sentence"). Defendant's allegations of error are consequently 
unfounded.9 
Based on the above, the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences is well 
within legally prescribed limits and should be affirmed. See Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 
652-653 ("because the length and consecutive nature of the terms are within the statutory 
9To the extent defendant suggests that the trial court inappropriately, 
"automatically impose[s] consecutive sentences" in "many of his sentencing decisions," 
the suggestion is unfounded. See, e.g., State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, f7, 974 P.2d 279 
(declining to consider evidence which is not part of the record on appeal). Moreover, as 
demonstrated in the body of this point, any such suggestion is belied by the trial court's 
proper exercise of its discretion in sentencing defendant. 
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parameters, we cannot say that defendant's consecutive prison [] terms are either unfair 
or unnecessarily harsh"). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's jury convictions for aggravated burglary and for attempted murder 
should be affirmed. 
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He is trying to rip something off. Was he doing drugs? 
i,Por que entr6 a este casa? Usted va a este casa y despues, 
r^obaba en cosas en este casa? 
Why did you go into this house? You go to this house and 
then, would you steal things in this house? 
I just want to know why. 
El quiere saber por que usted entrd ese casa por la ventana. Era 
un... no era un... la mis vieja en este casa. Estaba... Where did 
he cut her? 
He wants to know why you went into this house. It was... it 
wasn't., the oldest lady in this house. He/she was... Where did 
he cut her? 
Ah... got her finger, her shoulder, and puncture... 
Cortar esa chica en la deo, en la hombro y despues no pagar si es 
persona vieja. Eso es un mal cosa...[l/l£ So, ^ por que va a decir 
cuando que piensa? 
To cut that young lady in her finger, her shoulder, and then not 
to pay if it is an old person. Thaf s a bad thing...[U/Q. So, why 
1 











,Cuando? Pues^Por d7ogas?-Por... 
len? Well, because ofdrugs? For...__,_ 
Por una cosa. Usted puede-.-^ Probaban la cerveza por drogas? 
cPor que? 
For one thing. You can... Would you try beer for drugs? Why? 
Yo no... no... no... Cuando yo me metf, no habia... no habia nadie. 
No habla gente. Ya... el cuarto ya no habia nadie. En el cuarto ya 
no habia muebles ni ropa. Nada. 
I didn't., didn't., didn't.. When I got in, there wasn't., there 
wasn't anybody. There wasn't anybody. It already... There 
wasn't anybody in the room anymore. There wasn't any 
furniture or clothes. Nothing. 
He said that there was nothing... nothing in the house when he was 
there. 
[VOICES OVERLAP] Was... was this...? Why? Was it because she 
pissed you off because she came out and told you guys to quit 
drinking with the little girls and those type of things? 
Porque ella...esta vieja... [VOICE OVERLAPS WITH 
DETECTIVE'S] 
Because she... this old lady... [VOICE OVERLAPS WITH 
DETECTIVE'S] 
Told you to leave the place? 
...antes... justed se habia enojado con ella porque eila le dip que 
usted tenia que salir y no dar cerveza a la chica... a las chicas 
menores? 
...before... did you get upset with her because she told you 
that you had to get out and not give beer to the young lady... 
to minor young ladies? 
No. A mi nadie me dijo nada ahi. 
No. Nobody told me anything in there. 
Nuestro sabemos que usted tenia un disgusto con la chica vieja. 





him fighting around, arguing with the old ladv. Nuestro sabemos 
que usted tien problem con la chica vieja. Ok. Ella le diso: eila no 
queremos usted por la madrugada tomando cerveza... la cerveza 
con la chica vieja... minores. 
Our know that you would have an argument with the old young 
lady. Ok? Because many people I see you. A lot of people have 
seen him fighting around, arguing with the old ladv. Our know 
that you ha a problem with the old young lady. Ok. She telled 
you: she we don't want you in the early morning drinking 
beer... the beer with the old young lady... minors. 
Yo no nunca tomaba afuera. Yo tomaba en el apartamento arriba. 
Yo vivfa arriba de...[l/l]. 
I would never drink outside. I would drink inside the apartment 
above. I used to live above...[U/l]. 
He says he would drink in the apartment 
Los que tomaban afuera eran otros muchachos que iban andar ahi 
a dar vuelta por ahi. Vendian droga y venden droga y estan todas 
las noches, todos los dias. 
The ones who would drink outside were other guys that would 
go there to hang around in there. They would sell drugs and 
they sell drugs. They are there every night every day. 
Interpreter: ^Quien vende drogas? 
Who sells drugs? 
Juan: Los muchachos que andan ahi. 
The guys who hang around there. 
Interpreter 
Juan: 
tComo se llaman los muchachos? 
What are the guys' names? 
No se c6mo se llaman. [VOCES SE ENTRELAZAN].. 
I don't know their names. [VOICES OVERLAP]... 
Interpreter: 
Juan: 
He says [VOICES OVERLAP]... 
...Yo trabajo. Yo no vendo droga ni nada. 
...I work. I don't sell drugs or anything. 








Este muchacho que vende drogas iv'we con el? 
This guy that sells drugs, do you live with him? 
No. Ellos llegan ahi al barrio. 
No. They go there to the neighbor^ 
He says he leaves in the 'barrio'. He ., jes to the 'barrio'. I guess... 
So. el no vive en el barrio. El va al barrio. 
So, he doesn't live in the neighborhood. He goes to the 
neighborhood. 
Ellos van para alia. 
They go over there. 
Someone goes there. The name is not necessarily right, but... 






You got my guy? 
Yeah. 
Got it? Do you want to interrupt that? 




Ok. Juan, we know... we know you were in the apartment. You 
admit to that. Ok. I just want to know why... ah... How she got cut. 
Did she get cut with a knife or was it from her being thrown around 
in the room? That is the biggest thing I want to know. With the 
knife? or Did she get kicked... get cut by hitting the wall or hitting 

















No. Entre a una... con una mujer pero cuando entre yo al 
apartamento ya no habia nadie. Cuando yo entre al 
apartamento...[INTERPRETER INTERRUPTS] 
No. I got a... I went in with a woman, but when I went into the 
apartment, there wasn't anybody there anymore. When I went 
into the apartment.. [INTERPRETER INTERRUPTS] 
When he went...[U/l]... 
...ya no habia gente. Ya no habia muebles ni nada. 
...there wasn't anybody anymore. There wasn't any furniture or 
anything. 
He says that nobody was there. 
Ok. Well, we know that somebody was there. 
[Frase l/l]... en el apartamento. 
[U/l phrase]... in the apartment 
I just want to know how she got her finger cut and her arm... and 
her arm cut. Was it with a knife or was it her hitting something, 
hitting her bed or...? 
<j,listed tiene un [palabra l/l] or knife? 





Cuando entre al apartamento ni me fije. Nomas me meti asi sin 
nada, pero ya no habia nada. No habia gente. 
When I went into the apartment I did pay attention. I just went 
in without anything, but there was nothing already. There 
wasn't anybody. 
He is saying that nobody was there. 
The day that that happened, we went there. The police went there 













apartment that same day... that same night. So, there was people 




Ahi no vive nadie. Cuando a mi me agarraron hoy, no vivia nadie. 
No vive nadie ahi en ese apartamento. No hay gente. 
Nobody lives there. When I was arrested today, there was 
nobody living there. Nobody lives there in that apartment 
There isn't anybody. 
He says nobody. 
No me esta diciendo toda la verdad. 
You are not telling me the whole truth. 
Si le estoy diciendo la verdad. Cuando yo me met! en el 
apartamento, no habia gente. No Neve cuchillo ni nada porque yo 
lleve a una muchacha... [INTERPRETEINTERRUPE] 
I am telling you the truth. When I went into the apartment, there 
was nobody. I didn't take a knife or anything with me because I 
took a girl with me... [INTERPRETER INTERRUPTS] 
He is saying that there was no knife, no people. 
...lleve a una muchacha para hacer el amor ahi con ella. Por eso 
me meti al apartamento. 
...I took a girl in with me to make love with her there. That's 
why I went into the apartment 
i,Esa muchacha es tu novia? 
Is that girl your girlfriend? 
No. No la conozco. La agarre en la calle. 
No. I don't know her. I got her on the street 
He says he doesn't know. He says he got her on the street. 
Your fingerprints are inside the window, Juan. Ah... when reached 














La venta tiene su huella. 
The sale has your fingerprint 
Disculpeme. Cuando lleve a la muchacha me met! por la ventana y 
abri la puerta y ella se metio. 
Excuse me. When I took the girl, I went in through the window 
and I opened the door and she went in. 
i listed entrd inlegal? *the word inlegal does not exist in 
Spanish. The correct word is ilegai. 
Did you go in illegally? 
No. 
No. 
He said they went in the apartment with permission and that... 
Permission from who? 
cDe quien? ^ Permiso de quien? 
Whose? Whose permission? 
De nadie. Yo me meti asi nomas porque no habia gente y estaba 
abierta la ventana. 
Nobody's. I just went in because there wasn't anybody there 
and the window was open. 
i,C6mo entr6 un apartamento? Ese no es su apartamento, 
^correcto? Es de otro persona. <,C6mo entro? 
How did you go an apartment? That is not your apartment, 
right? If s another person's. How did you go in? 
No. No habia gente. No habia gente, pero me meti porque la 
ventana estaba abierta. 
No. There wasn't anybody. There wasn't anybody, but I went in 
because the window was open. 
He is saying that there wasn't anybody there. He is saying... 
Yo no entiendo sefior. 
I don't understand sir. 
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Juan: La ventana estaba abierta. 
The window was open. 
Interpreter: He is saying that the window was open. 
Interpreter Pero usted no tiene permiso para entrar al apartamento, 
^correcto? 
But you don't have permission to go into the apartment, 
correct? 
Juan: No. No tenia permiso de nadie. 
No. I didn't have anybody's permission. 
Interpreter Ok. So, he is admitting that., ok... 
Interpreter Usted tiene [frase l/l] entrar al apartmento. 
You have [U/l phrase] to go into the apartment 
Interpreter So, he understood that it is against the law to enter the apartment 
Detective: Which... which window did he enter? Was it the bedroom window? 
Where the kitchen is? or where the living room is at? 
Interpreter Ah... <,Que venta entr6 usted? 
Ah... What sale did you go in? 
Juan: Por la... por la cocina. 
Through... through the kitchen. 
Interpreter The kitchen window. 
Detective: How did he leave? 
Interpreter ^Y c6mo salir el apartamento? 
And how to leave the apartment? 
Juan: Me saii por la puerta con la muchacha despues. 
I later left through the door with the girl. 
Interpreter Through the door. 














Es una guera. No !a conozco. La agarre en la calle. No se quien 
es. 
It's a blonde girl. I don't know her. I got her on the street I 
don't know who she is. 
He says that he doesn't know the person [Rest of phrase is U/l]. It's 
just a lady. 
Does the door have a... a lock that you have to have a key with 
inside? 
^Usted necesita un Have por la puerta? 
Do you need a key for the door? 
No. Por dentro le quite el seguro y cuando ya sali le puse otra vez 
el seguro y ya sali por la puerta. 
No. I unlocked from the inside. When I then went out, I locked 
it and left through the door. 
What? Yo no entiendo. ^Usted no necesita la Have? 
What? I don't understand. Don't you need a key? 
No. Me met! por la ventana cuando me meti pa' dentro. Y ya 
despues cuando me sali pa' fuera abri la puerta. [PAUSA] Cuando 
me vine para afuera... cuando me sali... 
No. I went in through the window when I went in. And when I 
later left, I opened the door. [PAUSE] When I went outside... 
when I left.. 
Uh-huh. 
...abri la puerta. 
...I opened the door. 
He says that he opened the door. 
Le quite el seguro. 
I unlocked i t 
^La Have en el lock? 
The key in the lock? 
Juan: No. No tenia Have. Nomas asi. Le quite el seguro. No tenia seguro. 
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No. It didn't have a key. Just without i t I unlocked i t It didn't 
have a lock. 
interpreter He says he didn't have to use a key. He just opened the door and 
left. 
Detective: What time did he... what time did he enter the... the... the 
apartment? What time of the day or night? 
Interpreter <,Que hora entr6 al apartamento? 
What time did you go into the apartment? 
Juan: Pues, serian como a las tres o las dos de la tarde. 
Well, it must have been at around three or two in the 
afternoon. 
Interpreter Ok. Three P.M. 
Interpreter [U/l Phrase in Spanish] 
Juan: Mas o menos. No estoy seguro. 
More or less. I'm not sure. 
Interpreter Ok. He is not sure it was at three. 
Detective: Three in the morning. 
Interpreter iQe la tarde o de la mafiana? 
In the afternoon or in the morning? 
Juan: De la ma... de la tarde. 
In the mor... in the afternoon. 
Interpreter Ok. 
Detective: Well, he is obviously changing the story going back and forth. 
Ah... 
Interpreter He did admit that he entered the apartment 
Detective: Yeah, he admitted that he... that he went in. That's how his 
fingerprints got in there. But obviously, they didn't know that he 















have a dead bolt or a key that you have to use on the inside to 
leave. So, he had to leave off the window. So... there is no way he 
could have left out the door. 
Listed no puede salir por la puerta, senor. Usted salir apartamento, 
usted necesita sale por la venta. ^Correcto? 
You can't go out the door, sir. You to leave apartment, you 
need leave through sale. Right? 
No. Entre por la ventana y sali por la puerta. 
No. I went in through the window and I left through the door. 
He is saying: He entered through the window and he left through 
the door. 
Did the girl leave with you at the same time? 
i,Esta muchacha estaba ahi con usted? 
Was this girl there with you? 
Si. Ella sali6 primero y despues sail yo. 
Yes. She went out first and then I did. 
iElla? 
She? 
Ella salid mas primero y despues sali yo. 
She went out first and then I did. 
Ok. ^Con usted? 
Ok. With you? 
Si. 
Yes. 
Ok. He is saying that the girl went to the door first and then he 
followed. 
Why is it that when the police came right after that happened...? 
Cuando la policia estaba en el apartamento... 














...the people were there that... with us, you coming... going into the 
apartment and coming out of the apartment when they were there, 
why are they saying this about you? 
The gente cerca del apartamento dice usted ir al apartamento a or 
[PAUSA] I oet bad with stuff like this. 
The people near the apartment say you to go to the apartment 
to or [PAUSE] \ get bad with stuff like this. 
I can understand. 
Ah... La gente dice usted enter el apartamento y usted sale del 
apartamento. 
Ah... The people say you enter the apartment and you go out 
the apartment 
SI entre pero me sali tambien por la puerta. Entre por la ventana y 
me sali por la puerta. 
Yes, I went in, but I also left through the door. I went in through 
the window and I left through the door. 
Ok. He is saying... 
SI me vieron porque era de dfa. Yo pienso que si me vid la gente 
porque era de dia. 
I was seen because it was daylight I think that people saw me 
because it was daylight 
iLa gente dice la verdad? 
Do the people say the truth? 
No se. Ella dice la verdad porque me vid que entre yo pero eso de 
dia. A lo mejor me vieron que me meti. 
I don't know. She is saying the truth because she saw me go 
in, but that was during the day. Maybe I was seen when I went 
in. 
Ok. He is saying that he did go in. That he was seen going in. 














And leave? [PAUSE] Does he... [PAUSE] I... Is he here legally? 
[U/l PHRASE] [VOICES FROM DETECTIVE AND INTERPRETER 
OVERLAP] 
^Tienes los documentos propios para los Estados Unidos, sefior? 
Ok iUsted entro inlegai*? Ok ^Por cuanto tiempo vive usted en los 
Estados Unidos? 
Do you have your own documents for the United States, sir? 
Ok. Did you come illegally? Ok, How long do you live in the 
United States for? 
Como cuatro aflos. 
About four years. 
Ok. ^Tiene documentos? Ok. Ah... <,Ha sido arrestado en los 
Estados Unidos antes? 
Ok. Do you have documents? Ok. Have you been arrested in 





Por estar tomando. 
For drinking. 
Ok. Ha sido arrestado de la Migra antes? 
Ok. Have you been arrested of the immigration before? 
No. 
No. 
i,Tenia problemas con los polocias en su pais? 
Did you have problems with the police in your country? 
No. 
No. 
i,Nunca has tenido...? 




Interpreter: Ok. Ah... I just wanted to know what... He entered four years ago. 










Alright. Just tell him... Ask him what he is more scared of: You guys 
from immigration or to have to deal with the local police. Being 
deported back or having to deal with the charge. 
Usted tiene dos opci6n: dar a la corte del estado por este cargo o 
regresar para Mexico. ^ Que quiere usted? 
You have two option: to give the State court for this charge or 
to go back to Mexico. What do you want? 
Regresar a Mexico. 
To go back to Mexico. 
Ok. He... He'd much rather be deported. 
<,Que? ^ Cdrno? No le entendf. ^Como me dijo? 
What? How? I didn't understand you. What did you tell me? 
Ok. Usted tiene dos opcion: Regresar para Mexico o... porque 
usted no tiene documentos, <i,correcto? o estar en la carcel por el 
[Frase l/l] por estos cargos. 
Ok. You have two option: To go back to Mexico or... because 
you don't have documents, right? Or Stay in jail for the [U/l 
PHRASE] for these charges. 
En Mexico, no tengo nada. <,Que voy a hacer en Mexico? Alia esta 
mi familia y yo le mandaba dinero. Por eso vine aca. 
I don't have anything in Mexico. What am I going to do in 
Mexico? I have my family there and I was sending them money. 
That's why I came here. 
i,Este enojado dice la verdad? ^Usted no tiene problemas con ese 
lugar? 
Does this upset one say the truth? Don't you have problems 













No. Yo no tengo problema con nadie alia donde vivo. No se por 
que me estan acusando de eso. 
No. I don't have problems with anyone where i live. I don't 
know why I am being accused of that 
Ok. i,La gente en la calle no dice la verdad? 
Ok. Don't people on the street say the truth? 
Si. Yo me meti a ese apartamento pero fue de dia cuando me meti, 
y me meti con una muchacha. No se si vieron a la muchacha 
tambien; a la seftora. 0 nada mas me vieron a mi. No se. 
Yes. I went into that apartment, but it was during the day when 
I went in. And I went in with a girl. I don't know if the girl was 
also seen, the woman. Or maybe I was the only one seen, i 
don't know. 
That night, he says, he didn't do anything. 
All I want to know, Juan, is that we know you did it. Ok? We... we 
want to make sure that there isn't anybody else that was involved 
that is out there that is doing these same things. That there is 
another person that is going to be burglarized and hurting people. 
Is there anybody else that was involved with it... with you? Are you 
the only one that did it that went into the apartment? Or Is there 
anyone else? 
iEntrd al apartamento con otro persona? 
Did you go into the apartment with another person? 
No. Nomas con la muchacha. 
No. Just with the girl. 
[Frase l/l] serlor. 
[U/l Phrase] sir. 
i,C6mo? 
What? 
^listed entro al apartamento con otro gente? 
Did you go into the apartment with another people? 
No. Con la muchacha entre. 
No. I went in with the girl. 
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£Y nada mas? 















Ok. Porque el no quiere mas problemas con la mujer y la otra 
gente en esa... 
Ok. Because he doesn't want to have more problems with the 
woman and the other people in that.. 
Yo tampoco quiero que la muchacha tenga problema porque ella... 
Yo le pague 20 pesos a ella. Veinte (20) dolares le pague. 
I don't want the girl to have problems either because she... I 
paid her 20 'pesos'. I paid her 20 dollars. 
^Porque? 
Why? 
Porque... para que hiciera el amor conmigo. 
Because... so she would make love to me. 
Yo no entiendo. Usted pag6 20 dollars por... 
I don't understand. You paid 20 dollars for... 
Por hacer el amor con la muchacha y ella me cobrd 20 dolares por 
hacer el amor. Yo se los di y la lleve para alia para el apartamento. 
To make love with the girl; and she charged me 20 dollars to 
make love. I gave them to her and I took there to the 
apartment 
lie pagd 20 dollars por eso nomas? 
Did you pay her 20 dollars for that only? 
Aja. 
Uh-huh. 
Now, he is saying that he paid 20 dollars for this girl. 
Pardon me. 













i,Es su novia o...? 
Is she your girlfriend or...? 
No. No es mi novia. No la conozco. Yo la mire en la calle. Estaba 
sentada en la calle ella y yo le dije que si queria hacer un party. 
Ella me dijo que si. 
No. She is not my girlfriend. I don't know her. I saw on the 
street She was sitting on the street and I asked her if she 
wanted to have a party. She told me yes. 
[LAUGHS] Now, he is saying that now the girl would talk to. 
Y ella me dijo que si. Yo me la lleve para alia... para... para alia... 
para ei carro. Yo le dije que nos podiamos quedar en mi carro. Y 
ella me dijo que no que ahi estaba el apartamento que no habia 
gente y que la ventana estaba abierta. Yo me meti a abrirla. 
So, she said yes. I took her to... to... over there... to the car. I 
told her that we could stay in my car. She said no. She said 
that there was an apartment there; that there wasn't anybody 
there and the window was open. I got in to open the window. 
That doesn't seem to be what he was saying [U/l Phrase] ago. 
Esa es la verdad. 
That's the truth. 
No. It wasn't. We have [U/l Phrase] other than what he said about 
her going in there with him. He had told about leaving with her. But, 
being a prostitute was never brought up. [IN A LOUDER VOICE 
DETECTIVE SAYS:] Who cares about the prostitute? That's not 
what I'm asking, Juan. I think you understand a little bit more 
because our officers just arrested you the other night. I think you 
understand me when I'm speaking English to you. All right? 
[DETECTIVE AND INTERPRETER LAUGH] 
You can tell right there. 
We picked him up for a D.I.U, and that's why he got picked up. 
I think Juan knows he can speak English OK. [U/l Phrase] 










Wasn't it because she pissed you off... she pissed you guys off that 
you went in there? Did you go in there to steal something? Or Did 
you go in there to hurt her? Because if you went in there to steal 
something, I can nre less. 
No entiendo mu. j . Poquito. 
I don't understand a lot A little. 
i?or que entrd un apartamento, sefior? 
Why did you go in apartment, sir? 
Oh, porque ella queria coger en el carro y ese es un delito estar en 
la calle. 




SI, ella queria en mi carro. Pero si me veia la policia, me iba a 
arrestar por estar haciendo cosas ilegales en la calle. Por eso, 
mejor me met! al apartamento. 
Yes. She wanted it in my car. But if the police would see me, 
they were going to arrest me for doing illegal things on the 
street That is why it was better for me to go into the 
apartment 
Esta mujer quien vive en el apartamento... 
That woman who lives in the apartment-
No. Es la otra que estaba en la calle. No la que vivia en el 
apartamento. No la sertora que vivia ahi. No la conozco. Yo 
apenas llegue por ahi ai apartamento. 
No. it was the other that was on the street It's not the one that 
lived in the apartment It's not the lady that used to live there. I 
don't know her. I just went to the apartment 
El vi6 que usted tiene un problema con esta mujer en el 
apartamento. 
He saw that you have a problem with this woman in the 
apartment 
Juan: No. Yo no tengo problema con ninguna mujer ahi. 
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No. I don't have a problem with any woman there. 
Interpreter: He is saying that he didn't have a problem with the lady. 
Detective: Does he know who she is? Has he seen her before? 
Interpreter ^listed conozco la mujer que vive el apartamento? 
Do you I know the woman that lives the apartment? 
Juan: No. 
No. 
Interpreter. [Frase l/l] 
[U/l Phrase] 
Juan: No. No se ni como se llama. Si la mire una sefiora que vive ahi con 
otro muchacho- Una sefiora grande y un muchacho grerludo. No 
la conozco yo. 
No. I don't even know what her name is. I saw a woman that 
used to live there with a young guy-an older lady and a 
tangled-hair guy. 
[U/l INTERPRETER'S AND DETECTIVE'S VOICE OVERLAP] 
Juan: No la conozco yo. 
I don't know her. 
Interpreter He is saying that he has seen her but he doesn't know her. He 
doesn't know her name. 
Detective: So, he knows who she is or where she lives. She's lived for over 
six months. She hasn't moved out. So the apartment hasn't been 
vacant. Ok? We know that Do you understand? 
Juan: Poquito. 
A little. 
Detective. Ok. The apartment wasn't vacant They were living there. That's a 
bull shit story is what you are telling that it was empty. We know 
that. Ok? We know you were inside because your finger prints 
were inside. Is there anything that you took? That's all I want to 
know. Is there anything that you took? Did you take anything out of 
















<Jienes la propiedad de esta mujer? 
Do you have the property of this woman? 
No. 
No. 
Cuando usted sale de su apartamento, <,trae otro [PALABRA l/l]? 
When you go out of your/her apartment, did you have [U/l 
word? 
No. Me sail asi con la muchacha. Nothing. No agarre nada. No 
habia nada. 
No. I left with the girl. Nada. i didn't grab anything. There 
wasn't anything. 
i,No dinero o...? 
No money or...? 
No. No habia nada. No habia muebles, nada. No habia nada. No 
habia ropa, nada. 
No. There wasn't anything. There was no furniture. Nothing. 
There wasn't anything. There wasn't any clothes. Nothing. 
He says that he didn't touch anything. 
No TV? No...? 
Nada. No habia nada. 




Did you through any of the stuff... any of the... ah... closets or 
anything like while you were there looking for something? 
i,Busc6 por el apartamento? ^Por cosas? 
Did you look around the apartment? Fdr thins? 
No. No. Yo meti nada mas para hacer el amor con la muchacha. 
No. No. I only went in there to make love with the girt. 
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Interpreter No? 
Juan: No. No habia ropa. No habia nada. 
No. There wasn't any clothes. There wasn't anything. 
Interpreter ^Pero el apartamento tiene mesas y... ah... y propiedad? 
But the apartment has tables and ... ah... and property? 
Juan: No. No tenia nada cuando yo me meti. No habia gente. No vivia 
nadie. 
No. It didn't have anything when I got in there. There weren't 
people. Nobody lived there. 
Interpreter He says that there was nothing there. I asked him if there was a 
table or anything. He said nothing. 
Detective: Well, I think that... I mean he was going there to try to have sex. 
There was some money that was taking. Did you take it? 
Juan: Yo nunca... 
I never... 
Interpreter ^listed saca el dinero? 




Juan: Seguro que no agarre el dinero. 
I assure you I didn't take the money. 
Interpreter No. La verdad, sefior. 
No. The truth, sir. 
Juan': La verdad. 
The truth. 
Interpreter ^Cuanto dinero tiene usted? 
How much money do you have? 
Juan: Ahorita mi... ^En donde? 
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Cuando usted sale del apartamento. ^Cuanto dinero tenia usted? 
Cuando usted... 
When you go out the apartment How much money did you 
have? When you... 
There was somebody in her... in her bedroom. Did you take the 
money that was out of her bedroom? I... I don't care about what 
happened to her. Ok? I want to find out about the money. Did you 
take any money that was in her apartment when you were there? 
i,Que pas6 con el dinero? 
What happened with the money? 
^Que dinero? Yo... yo... yo trabajo. El dinero que yo gano yo... 
What money? I... I... I work. The money that I make, I... 
[U/ll 
That*s what she said. She said that she had money in her apart... 
in her bedroom when this person... when you... when you came in. 
She says that there was money in there. Is she lying? Or Is she 
telling the truth? Was there money or not? 
Cuando usted entr6 a su apartamento, la mujer dice usted tiene 
ah... elia tiene dinero. ^Usted saca este dinero? Or ^Esa mujer no 
dice la verdad? 
When you went into her apartment, the woman says you have 
ah... she has money. Do you take this money? Or Is she not 
telling the truth? 
Yo no... Cuando yo entre al apartamento, no habia gente. 
I don't.. When iwent into the apartment, there wasn't anybody. 
He saying: No one was there. 
Cuando yo me meti no habia nada. No habia... 
When I went in there was nothing in there. There wasn't... 
<,Y no bolsas, no... no... no dinero... no nada? 











Nada. No habia gente. No habia gente. Yo me met! nomas con la 
muchacha. Yo! Yo nomas solito con la muchacha. 
Nothing. There wasn't anybody. There wasn't anybody. I only 
went in with the girt. II I, by myself, went in with the girt. 
He says he just went with the lady. No one else was there. 
No habia gente. No habia gente en esa casa... en ese 
apartamento ese donde dice. 
There wasn't anybody. There wasn't anybody in that house... 
in that apartment you're saying. 
Sefior, la version que dice usted entro a este apartamento y... una 
mujer tenia apartamento. Y esta mujer tiene problemas con usted. 
Yo no entiendo. 
Sir, your story is that you went into that apartment and... a 
woman had apartment And this woman has problems with 
you. I don't understand. 
Yo la mujer que Jleve, !a agarre en \a calle. No... no... no... En \a 
calle iba yo en mi carro y la mire. Ella estaba sentada y yo le 
habie. Le dije si queria hacer party. Ella me dijo que si. 
The woman that I took, I got on the street No... no... no... I was 
in my car on the street and i saw her. She was seating and I 
spoke to her. I asked her if she wanted to party. She said yes. 
[U/l] 
Esa es la verdad. Es la verdad lo que le estoy diciendo. No estoy 
diciendo mentiras. 
That*s the truth. What I'm saying is the truth. I'm not saying 
lies. 
What do you think is going to happen to you, Juan, when you go to 
trial? When you get prosecuted for this? 
I don't see the need to ask him that. I don't think he is going to 
come clean with anything. 
What if you do go to trial? And you go to prison. If you tell them the 
truth, do you know what is going to happen to you? Salt Lake City, 
Utah. You tell them the truth and the judge... well, I don't want to 















you tell the truth [U/l word]. Ok. If you tell the truth of what 
happened, more likely all is going to happen is maybe you just be 
deported. Maybe. 
No guarantees. 
No guarantees, but if you seat there and lie to everything and don't 
come clean with us, then what do you think they are going to do? 
They got your finger prints on the inside of that apartment. They 
know you were there. 
Yo no robe nada. No robe nada yo. 
I didn't steal anything. I didn't steal anything. 
He says he didn't rob anybody. 
Was there any other people inside the apartment when you went in 
other than the lady? 
^Tiene...? Cuando usted entrd departamento, justed entr6 con 
otra persona o usted y esa mujer solamente? 
Do you have...? When you went into apartment, did you go in 
with another person or you and that woman only? 
Nomas yo y la muchacha. La seriora. 
Only the girt and myself. The lady. 
Ok. And the girl. 
i,E! apartamento tiene otra persona? 
Does the apartment have another person? 
No. No habia. 
No. There wasn't 
No. ^No persona? 
No. No person? 
No. Dos personas. Yo y la muchacha. 















Do you know the old lady's son? Have you seen him before? 
Ha visto la novia... Oh, perdon... la nifio de tu mujer? 
Have you seen the girlfriend... Ohl sorry... the boy of your 
woman? 
No. No se si tiene niiios. 
No. I don't know if she has small children. 
[U/l] 
No. He is not a kid anymore. He is forty years old. 
Oh. 
It's your last chance, Juan. I'm going to walk out of the door. I'm 
going to go tell the... You know... finish my paperwork and basically 
say that... that you lied about everything and wouldn't come clean 
with anything and you are not going to stand up to your mess. 
La ultima persona dice la verdad, seftor. 
The last person tells the truth, sir. 
Ya le dije la verdad. Nomas lleve a la muchacha. Nomas yo. Yo y 
la muchacha y no habia nada. No habia muebles. Nada. Esa es la 
verdad. 
I already told the truth. I only took the girl. Myself only. The girl 
and myself, and there wasn't anything. There wasn't furniture. 
Nothing. That's the truth. 
You know... If you... If you come clean with us, maybe you can 
work something with the District Attorney and a plea for the charge. 
Si usted dice la verdad, usted... depende lo... usted no va a [Frase 
l/l]...nuevamente en Mexico... no violar nunca la ley o la plicia. 
Claro que si usted no dice la verdad... 
If you teli the truth, you... it depends on... you are not going 
to... [U/l Phrase]... in Mexico again... never violate the law or 
'plicia*. [INTERPRETER INTERPRETED THE ENGLISH WORD 
"PLEA'' AS 'PLICIA'. 'PLICIA' DOES NOT EXIST IN SPANISH] 
Estoy diciendo la verdad. [EMPHATIC STATEMENT] 









I'm telling the truth. 
Esa es la verdad. Ya mi se quiere deportar, pues me deporta. No 
hay problema. 
That's the truth. If you want to deport me, then deport me. No 
problem. 
What did he say? 
That that's the truth. 
Ok. [RECORDING WAS STOPPED AND STARTED AGAIN] 
[Frase l/l]... se salio ella y yo tambien me sali. Esa es la verdad. Yo 
acepto que me metf, pero yo no agarre nada. Ya estaba limpio ei 
apartamento. Ya no habia muebles. No habia nada. No habia 
cama. Nada. Esa es la verdad. 
[U/l Phrase]... she went out and I also went out That's the 
truth. I accept responsibility for going in, but I didn't take 
anything. The apartment was already clean. There wasn't any 
furniture anymore. There wasn't anything. There wasn't a bed. 
Nothing! That*s the truth. 
Ok. 
[END OF RECORDING] 
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Case No. 9919I4QT7 FS 
The undersigned Detective Norton - Midvale City Police Department, Agency Case No. 
99-5114, under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree Felony, at 533 West Tiffany Town Drive, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about August 9, 1999, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 
6, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JUAN 
QUITERIO PEREZ, a party to the offense, entered or remained unlawfully in the 
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COUNT II 
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, a Second Degree Felony, at 533 West 
Tiffany Town Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about August 9, 1999, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendant, JUAN QUITERIO PEREZ, a party to the offense, attempted to 
intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Ellen Kuhel. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Ellen Kuhel, Robert Kuhel, Detective Wathan, Detective Burgon, Officer Holdaway, 
Detective Norton, Karen Suprunowicz, Officer Yurgelon, Officer Proulx, and Dean 
Warnke. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this Information upon the following: 
1. The statement of Ellen Kuhel, to Midvale Police Officer B. Holdaway, that on 
August 9, 1999, she was at her home, located at 533 West Tiffany Town Drive, Salt Lake 
County, Utah. At approximately 12:30 a.m., Ms. Kuhel was awakened by a male who was in her 
bedroom "punching" her. Ms. Kuhel struggled with the male, and then kicked him in the groin. 
At that time the male left Ms. Kuhel's home. Ms. Kuhel awakened her son, and then telephoned 
the police. 
2. The statement of Officer Holdaway that he observed blood coming from Ms. 
Kuhel's head and a gash under her eye. Officer Holdaway also noted that there was blood on 
Ms. Kuhel's nightgown, the light switch, the wall in the hallway, and Ms. Kuhel's bed . Ms. 
Kuhel was transported to the hospital for her injuries. 
3. The written statement of Dr. Karen Suprunowicz that she works in the emergency 
room at Cottonwood Hospital, located at 5770 South 300 East. Dr. Suprunowicz treated Ms. 
Kuhel for her injuries, and determined that Ms. Kuhel had been stabbed. Ms. Kuhel required 
sutures for her scalp and face, and Dr. Suprunowicz noted that there were abrasions on Ms. 
Kuhel's shoulder, breast, right arm, palm, and thumb, as well as her left hand. 
4. The statement of Detective G. Wathen that he checked Ms. Kuhel's kitchen 
window, and located fingerprints on the frame and the tile below it. 
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5. The statement of Detective L. Burgon that he compared the above fingerprints 
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Addendum C 
INSTRUCTION NO. b 
At times throughout the trial the court has been called 
upon to determine whether certain offered evidence might pro-
perly be admitted. You are not to be concerned with the reasons 
for such rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. 
Whether offered evidence is admissible is purely a question 
of law. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, 
the court does not determine what weight should be given such 
evidence; nor does it pass on the credibility of the witness. 
You are not to consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor 
any evidence stricken out by the court; as to any question to 
which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to 
what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the 
objection. 
00285 
INSTRUCTION NO. \0 
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent 
witness in his own behalf and has the right to go upon the 
witness stand and testify if he chooses to do so. However, 
the law expressly provides that no presumption adverse to him 
is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself 
upon the witness stand. If he is satisfied with the evidence 
which has been given, there is no occasion for him to add 
thereto. 
So, in this case the mere fact that this defendant has 
not availed himself of the privilege which the law gives him 
should not prejudice him in any way. It should not be considered 
as any indication either of his guilt or of his innocence. The 
failure of the defendant to testify is not even a circumstance 
against him and no presumption of guilt can be indulged in the 
minds of the jury by reason of such failure on his part. 
00289 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^< 
Under the law of the State of Utah, Attempted Criminal 
Homicide constitutes Attempted Murder if the actor: 
(a) attempted to intentionally or knowingly cause the 
death of another; 
or, 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another 
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that attemptes to 
cause the death of another; 
or, 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing • a depraved 
indifference to human life engages in conduct which creates a 
grave risk of death to another and thereby attempts to cause the 
death of another. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^U> 
Before you can convict the defendant, JUAN Q. PEREZ, 
of the offense of Attempted Criminal Homocide, Murder, as 
charged in count II of the information, you must find from all 
of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one 
of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 9th day of August, 1999, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, JUAN Q.PEREZ, 
attempted to cause the death of ELLEN KUHEL; and 
2. That said defendant then and there did so: (a) 
intentionally or knowingly; or (b) intending to cause serious 
bodily injury to another, he committed an act clearly dangerous 
to human life, which act attempted to cause the death of ELLEN 
KUHEL; or (c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, he knowingly engaged in conduct 
which created a grave risk of death to another and which conduct 
attempted to cause the death of ELLEN KUHEL; and 
3. That said defendant then and there did so unlawfully. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Attempted Criminal 
Homocide,Murder as charged in count II of the information. If, 
on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt of any one or more of the foregoing eLements, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty of count II. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. Unt 
As used in these instructions, "grave risk of death" refers 
to probability of the risk of death greater than just a 
"substantial and unjustifiable" risk. A "grave risk of death" 
means a highly likely probability that death will result from 
the risk that the defendant knowingly creates. 
The term "knowingly" as used in the definition of depraved 
indifference murder means that the actor knew the nature of his 
conduct, knew the circumstances that gave rise to the risk of 
death, and knew that the risk constituted a grave risk of death, 
but he need not have had as his conscious objective or desire to 
cause the result; nor, need he be aware that his conduct is 
reasonably certain to cause the results i.e., death. 
The term "depraved indifference to human life" refers not 
to the subjective culpable mental state of depraved indifference 
murder, but rather to an objective reasonable person standard as 
to the value of human life. "Depraved indifference" means an 
utter callousness toward the value of human life and a complete 
and total indifference as to whether one's conduct will create a 
grave risk of death to another. Thus, a finding of depraved 
indifference must be based on an objective evaluation of the 
magnitude of the risk created and of all the circumstances 
surrounding the death. That evaluation should focus on the 
gravity of the risk to human life that is created and the 
callousness of attitude toward that risk. In evaluating the 
evidence, the jury should consider the following factors: (1) 
the utility of the defendant's conduct which attempted to cause 
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the death; (2) the magnitude of the risk created by tne 
defendant's conduct; (3) the defendant's knowledge of the risk; 
and (4) any precaution taken by the defendant to minimize that 
risk. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2 ^ , < Q 
I have previously used the term, "depraved indifference" m 
these instructions. The term is not specifically defined by 
statute. Thus, the phrase, "depraved indifference" is a concept 
which must be left largely to the experience and common sense of 
the jury. 
To engage in conducts with a "depraved indifference to human 
life, " a person must do more than act "recklessly, " but he need 
not have as his conscious objective or desire to cause the 
result/ nor need he be aware that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result. 
Rather, the greatness of the risk which the defendant's 
actions create and the lack of justification for the creation of 
the risk is the test to be applied in determining whether the 
defendant's conduct evidences a "depraved indifference to human 
life.» 
The circumstances under which the defendant acted must be 
viewed objectively by a reasonable man rather than subjectively 
by the actual state of the defendant's mind in order to 
determine whether the circumstances under which the defendant 




In determining any fact in this case you should not 
consider nor be influenced by any statement made or act done 
by the court which you may interpret as indicating its views 
thereon. You are the sole and final judges of all questions 
of fact submitted to you, and you must determine such questions 
for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you 
believe the court thinks thereon. The court has not intended 
to express, or intimate, or be understood as giving any opin-
ion on what the proof shows or does not show, or what are or 
what are not the facts in the case. And it is immaterial what 
the court thinks thereon. You must follow your own views and 
not be influenced by the views of the court. 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
NICHOLAS D'ALESANDRO 
DEPUTY S.L. DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
231 EAST 4TH SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
SCOTT WILLIAMS 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC. 
424 EAST FIFTH SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
2 
MAY 2 6 , 2 0 0 0 SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: MR. WILLIAMS. 
MR. WILLIAMS: JUAN QUITERIO PEREZ, NUMBER. 
991919507. HE'S IN CUSTODY. NUMBER 23. 
THE COURT: VERY WELL. STATE OF UTAH VS, 
JUAN Q. PEREZ, 99-9507. MR. WILLIAMS, YOU'RE 
APPEARING FOR THIS DEFENDANT. 
MR. WILLIAMS: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: MR. D'ALESANDRO, YOU'RE HERE 
FOR THE STATE? 
MR. D'ALESANDRO: I AM, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: YOU ARE. OH, EXCUSE ME, WE 
HAVE MS. UPDEGROVE HERE AS THE INTERPRETER. I WILL 
ASK YOU ONE MORE TIME TO TAKE THE OATH, 
MS. UPDEGROVE. 
(GLORIA UPDEGROVE SWORN AS INTERPRETER.) 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, MS. UPDEGROVE. 
YOU ARE JUAN QUITERIO PEREZ; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES. 
THE COURT: AND YOU ARE REPRESENTED HERE BY 
YOUR LAWYER, MR. WILLIAMS; IS THAT CORRECT? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES. 
A 
THE COURT: THIS MATTER IS ON THE CALENDAR 
INCIDENT TO SENTENCING. THE DEFENDANT WAS TRIED 
BEFORE A JURY ON THE 19TH OF APRIL OF THIS YEAR, 
WHICH RENDERED GUILTY VERDICTS IN THE TWO CHARGES, 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, A 1ST DEGREE FELONY, AND 
ATTEMPTED MURDER, A 2ND DEGREE FELONY. 
A PRESENTENCE REPORT WAS ORDERED AND HAS 
NOW BEEN RECEIVED AND REVIEWED. MR. WILLIAMS, YOU 
HAVE SEEN THE REPORT, HAVE YOU NOT? 
MR. WILLIAMS: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THERE IS ANY LEGAL REASON KNOWN 
TO YOU WHY I SHOULD NOT IMPOSE SENTENCE TODAY? 
MR. WILLIAMS: NO LEGAL REASON, THOUGH I DO 
WANT TO RENEW A LEGAL MOTION RELEVANT TO SENTENCING, 
BEFORE THE SENTENCING. BUT I THINK THAT AFTER THAT 
MOTION, REGARDLESS OF WHICH WAY YOUR HONOR RULES ON 
IT, THAT THE SENTENCING COULD PROCEED TODAY LEGALLY. 
THE COURT: DID YOU FILE A WRITTEN MOTION? 
MR. WILLIAMS: IT HAS BEEN FILLED ON TWO 
OCCASIONS. I JUST WANT TO MAKE SURE ON THE RECORD 
HERE AT THE SENTENCING, YOUR HONOR, THAT I RENEW MY 
REQUEST FOR YOUR HONOR TO MERGE THESE COUNTS 
PURSUANT TO THE ARGUMENTS. 
THE CASES I SUPPLIED TO THIS COURT, AND TO 
JUDGE ATHERTON IN SUPPORT OF THAT IN MY ARGUMENTS ON 
1 MERGER OF THE COUNTS IN FACT INCLUDES SCENARIOS THAT 
2 ARE POST-JUDGMENT SCENARIOS. THE APPEALS ARE 
3 POST-JUDGEMENT, AND THE FIRST TIME THE ARGUMENTS ARE 
4 MADE IS AT SENTENCING. 
5 IN MY CASE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT I MADE THE 
6 MOTION PRIOR TO SENTENCING. HOWEVER, I WANT TO BE 
7 SURE ON THE RECORD THAT I MAKE IT HERE AT 
8 SENTENCING, AS WELL, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE 
9 INTERVENING TRIAL AND THE FACT THAT THE CASE WAS 
10 PRESENTED AGAIN AT TRIAL, AND ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF 
11 THE FACT THAT BY AGREEMENT OF THE STATE --IN FACT I 
12 THINK -- OR AT LEAST WITHOUT OBJECTION AS PER THE 
13 JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS CASE, THE CASE WAS 
14 SUBMITTED TO THE JURY ON ONLY THE THEORIES OF 
15 AGGRAVATED BURGLARY AND AGGRAVATED -- I'M SORRY, 
16 ATTEMPTED MURDER, THAT I RELIED ON IN MY MERGER 
17 ARGUMENT INITIALLY. 
18 SO IN OTHER WORDS, IT'S NOT LIKE SOMETHING 
19 ELSE HAPPENED AT THE TRIAL THAT RAN CONTRARY TO MY 
2 0 ARGUMENTS THAT WERE MADE PRETRIAL ON THE MERGER 
21 ISSUE. AND IN FACT IT'S MY BELIEF THAT THE WAY THE 
2 2 FACTS DEVELOPED AT TRIAL AND THE WAY IT WAS GIVEN TO 
23 THE JURY ACTUALLY FURTHER SUPPORTS THE MERGER 
24 ARGUMENT. SO I WANT TO MAKE SURE AND RENEW IT 
25 BEFORE YOUR HONOR TODAY. 
1 THE COURT: OKAY. MR. WILLIAMS, I'M NOT 
2 PURSUADED THIS IS A CASE WHERE MERGER OUGHT TO HAVE 
3 TAKEN PLACE. MY RULING, THEREFORE, WILL STAND, AND 
4 THE MOTION IS DENIED. 
5 MR. WILLIAMS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
6 THE COURT: NOW THAT'S RESOLVED, YOU SAY 
7 THERE'S NO OTHER REASON YOU HAVE, NO LEGAL REASON, 
8 WHY WE SHOULDN'T PROCEED AT THIS TIME? 
9 MR. WILLIAMS: THAT'S CORRECT. 
10 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. BEFORE I PROCEED 
11 WITH SENTENCING/ DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY IN 
12 BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT. 
13 I MR. WILLIAMS: BRIEFLY. THE REASON IT'S 
14 BRIEF I'M SURE WILL BE OBVIOUS TO THE COURT. THIS 
15 COURT HEARD THE TRIAL, SO THERE'S NO NEED TO RELATE 
16 THE FACTS. 
17 AND MR. PEREZ HAS MAINTAINED HIS INNOCENCE, 
18 CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN IT. AND AS I HAVE INFORMED 
19 HIM, IT'S MY FEELING THAT ANY DRAWN-OUT AMOUNT OF 
2 0 ARGUMENT OR REQUEST FOR PROBATION WILL BE FUTILE. 
21 WHAT I'LL DO IS REQUEST YOUR HONOR, IF YOU 
2 2 THOUGHT OR COULD HAZARD ANY SUGGESTION THERE'S A 
23 PROBABILITY OF PROBATION, I WOULD BE HAPPY TO 
24 RESPOND IN ANY AREA THAT YOU MAY HAVE A QUESTION 
2 5 ABOUT. 
1 OTHERWISE, I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THERE 
2 IS 236 DAYS OF INCARCERATION ON THIS CASE AND 
3 REQUEST THAT IF YOUR HONOR ORDERS COMMITTMENT TO 
4 PRISON, THAT HE GET CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. I THINK 
5 THAT THE REALITY OF THAT IS UNLIKELY TO AFFECT THE 
6 SENTENCE, BUT WE WOULD ASK FOR CREDIT FOR TIME 
7 SERVED. 
8 THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. WILLIAMS. 
9 BEFORE I DECIDE WHAT TO DO HERE, MR. PEREZ, DO YOU 
10 WISH TO SAY ANYTHING? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: NO. 
12 THE COURT: VERY WELL. LET ME INQUIRE: 
13 MR. D'ALESANDRO, DO WE HAVE THE VICTIM OR VICTIM 
14 REPRESENTATIVE HERE WHO WISHES TO BE HEARD? MS. 
15 HOWELL, DO YOU WISH TO SPEAK, MA'AM, AT THIS TIME? 
16 I MS. HOWELL: NO. 
17 THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU. DOES THE 
18 STATE HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD IN THIS MATTER, 
19 I MR. D'ALESANDRO? 
20 I MR. D'ALESANDRO: YOUR HONOR, FRANKLY, 
21 THERE'S NOT MUCH TO ADD TO THE PRESENTENCE REPORT. 
22 THE COURT HAVING HEARD THE EVIDENCE, YOU'RE WELL 
23 AWARE OF WHAT I WOULD CONSIDER TO BE THE EGREGIOUS 
24 CONDUCT IN THIS CASE. 
25 THIS INDIVIDUAL, BASED ON THE CONDUCT AND 
1 HIS INABILITY TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS 
2 OFFENSE IN TERMS OF A SERIOUS THREAT TO THIS 
3 COMMUNITY, AND I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO FOLLOW THE 
4 PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION RECOMMENDATIONS, WHICH IT 
5 SEEMS TO ME TO BE APPROPRIATE IN THIS MATTER. 
6 THE COURT: THERE BEING NO LEGAL REASON WHY 
7 I SHOULD NOT IMPOSE SENTENCE, I WILL DO THAT AT THIS 
8 TIME. 
9 MR. PEREZ, HAVING HEARD THE EVIDENCE AT THE 
10 TRIAL, I AM PERSUADED THAT THE JURY VERDICT WAS 
11 CORRECT, THAT, INDEED, MR. PEREZ, THE CONDUCT IN 
12 WHICH YOU ENGAGED WAS -- EGREGIOUS,! I GUESS IS AN 
13 APPROPRIATE TERM. BREAKING INTO A LITTLE LADY'S 
14 HOME IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT AND STABBING HER 
15 WITH A KNIFE, WHICH OF COURSE IS WHAT THE JURY FOUND 
16 YOU GUILTY OF HAVING DONE, IN MY ESTIMATION IN THIS 
17 CIVILIZED SOCIETY CANNOT AND WILL NOT BE TOLERATED, 
18 MR. PEREZ. 
19 THEREFORE, IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
2 0 OF THIS COURT THAT YOU BE COMMITTED TO THE UTAH 
21 STATE PRISON FORTHWITH TO SERVE THE TERM PROVIDED BY 
22 LAW FOR THE FIRST DEGREE FELONY OF FIVE YEARS TO 
2 3 LIFE, AND FOR THE SECOND DEGREE FELONY OF ONE TO 15 
24 YEARS, AND THAT THOSE TERMS BE SERVED CONSECUTIVELY 
2 5 AND NOT CONCURRENTLY. 
1 AS I AM BOUND TO DO, I WILL GRANT YOU 
2 CREDIT FOR THE 236 DAYS THAT YOU HAVE SPENT IN 
3 CUSTODY AWAITING DISPOSITION IN THESE MATTERS. I 
4 WILL ORDER THAT YOU PAY RESTITUTION IN THE AMOUNT OF 
5 $500, WHICH IS WHAT IS NOW KNOWN, AND THAT YOU PAY 
6 RECOUPMENT FEE FOR THE SERVICES OF YOUR PUBLICALLY 
7 PROVIDED LAWYER OF $750. I KNOW YOUR SERVICES ARE 
8 WORTH MORE THAN THAT, MR. WILLIAMS, BUT I THINK 
9 THAT'S PROBABLY AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER. IF THERE IS 
10 NOTHING FURTHER, COUNSEL, THAT WILL BE THE ORDER. 
11 COMMITTMENT IS TO ISSUE FORTHWITH. 
12 I MR. WILLIAMS: THERE WAS ONE THING I WOULD 
13 LIKE TO MAKE A RECORD OF, AND I WOULD LIKE TO OBJECT 
14 TO THE CONSECUTIVE. EVEN UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS 
15 CASE IT SEEMS VERY CLEAR THAT IT WAS A SINGLE 
16 CRIMINAL EPISODE AND INVOLVEMENT OF MINUTES BY THE 
17 ASSAILANT IN THIS CASE. 
18 AND I DON'T THINK THAT THERE ARE ANY OTHER 
19 AGGRAVATING FACTORS. MR. PEREZ WASN'T ON PROBATION 
20 I AT THE TIME. AND WE WOULD ENTER AN OBJECTION AND 
21 REQUEST THAT YOU MODIFY AND ORDER THAT THEY RUN 
2 2 CONCURRENT. 
2 3 THE COURT: MR. WILLIAMS, YOUR REQUEST IS 
24 DENIED. I VIEW THE ACTIVITIES OF THIS MAN TO BE 
2 5 ESSENTIALLY TWO SEPARATE INCIDENTS. HE BROKE INTO 
m 
THE PLACE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT. AND THEN HE 
USES A KNIFE TO STAB THE VICTIM. THOSE, TO ME, ANY 
WAY YOU CUT IT, ARE TWO SEPARATE CRIMES. 
NOW, IF I WAS TO GRANT HIM CONCURRENT TERMS 
AT THE PRISON YOUR ULTIMATE APPEAL WOULDN'T HAVE 
NEAR THE POIGNANCY. GOOD LUCK TO YOU. 
MR. WILLIAMS: THANK YOU. THAT'S ALL I 
HAVE. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. WILLIAMS 
(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.) 
1 C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 STATE OF UTAH : 
3 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE : 
4 I, GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND 
5 REPORTER AND REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER IN THE 
6 STATE OF UTAH HEREBY CERTIFY: 
7 THAT I AM AN OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN THE 
8 THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH; 
9 THAT I WAS PRESENT DURING THE ENTIRE 
10 PROCEEDINGS IN THE BEFORE-ENTITLED CAUSE; 
11 THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WERE REPORTED 
12 STENOORAPHICALLY BY MB, AND WERE THEREAFTER 
13 TRANSCRIBED. 
14 THAT SAID TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTES TO THE 
15 BEST OF MY ABILITY A TRUE AND COMPLETE RECORD OF THE 
16 PROCEEDINGS HAD. 
17 IN WITNESS THEREOF, I HAVE SUBSCRIBED MY 
18 I NAME AND SEAL THIS 20TH DAY OF JUNE, 2000. 
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